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ARTICLES
RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIME CHANGE
Jay Butler∗
What obligations does a state have after it forcibly overthrows the
regime of another state or territory? The Hague Regulations and the
Fourth Geneva Convention provide some answers, but their prohibition
on interfering with the governing structure of the targeted territory is
outmoded. Based on a careful examination of subsequent practice of the
parties to the conventions, this Article asserts a new interpretation of
these treaties and argues that regime changers are now under positive
obligations in the postwar period and beyond.
Through their conduct and evaluation of modern regime-change
missions, states, both individually and acting collectively through inter-
national organizations, have manifested revised understandings of obli-
gations in the postconflict phase of military operations. Accordingly, this
Article argues that regime-changing states now not only have Geneva-
based direct obligations to establish security in the territory, promote rep-
resentative local government, protect the human rights of the local popu-
lation, assist with postconflict reconstruction, and safeguard minority
groups while exercising control over the territory, but also that such
states must ensure that the successor regime—whose installation their
initial military intervention facilitated—is one that respects interna-
tional human rights law.
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INTRODUCTION
Regime change is at a crossroads.1 International law presents formal
barriers to unilateral military intervention,2 but political leaders have
shown an increasing willingness to discuss forcible regime change as a
legitimate policy instrument to be deployed with or without the requisite
authorization of the United Nations Security Council.3 Moreover, states
1. In this Article, “regime change” is defined as the use of military force by a state or
states to overthrow the de facto or de jure government of another state or to enforce the
secession of foreign territory.
2. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.”).
3. See, e.g., Press Release, General Assembly, Secretary-General Presents His Annual
Report to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136 GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999)
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once diametrically opposed to outside regime change have since found
that the humanitarian justifications that often underlie such operations
may provide a convenient excuse to initiate military missions that adv-
ance their own strategic objectives.4 Indeed, some states have expressed
grave concern that humanitarianism may well be used as a pretext for
neocolonial interference.5
Amidst furor over the justifications for and conduct of military inter-
vention, the postconflict obligations of states are often overlooked. Inter-
national humanitarian law, comprised principally of the Hague
Regulations and Geneva Conventions, applies during periods of occupa-
tion by foreign military forces.6 However, this body of law formally pre-
(“If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the [Rwandan] genocide, a coalition of
States had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but did not receive
prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the
horror to unfold?”); see also Address to the Nation on the Situation in Libya, 2011 Daily
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1, 3–4 (Mar. 28, 2011) (“Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to
atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different. And as President, I
refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.”);
Jeremiah Goulka, Why Does Mitt Romney Want to Bomb Iran?, Nation (Nov. 5, 2012),
http://www.thenation.com/article/171023/dogs-war-are-barking (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing Mitt Romney’s avowed support for U.S. military
intervention to effect regime change in Iran); Barack Obama, David Cameron & Nicolas
Sarkozy, Op-Ed., Libya’s Pathway to Peace, N.Y. Times (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (arguing, while Security Council mandate covers protection of civilians, Qaddafi
regime must be removed); Newt Gingrich, Address at Florida International University
(Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://miami.cbslocal.com/video/6673072-web-extra-newt-
gingrich-speech-at-fiu/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (urging United States to
consider military intervention in Venezuela).
4. See, e.g., Interview by BBC with Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russ.,
in Moscow, Russ. (Aug. 9, 2008), transcript available at http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/b
rp_4.nsf/e78a4807f128a7b43256999005bsbb3/f87a3fb7a7f669ebc32574a100262597
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“According to our Constitution there is also
responsibility to protect—the term which is very widely used in the UN when people see
some trouble in Africa or in any remote part of the other regions. But [Georgia] is not
Africa to us, [it] is next door.”); see also Quentin Peel, Russia’s Reversal: Where Next for
Humanitarian Intervention?, Fin. Times (Aug. 22, 2008, 7:49 PM), http://ft.com/
cms/s/0/e06e25fc-7076-11dd-b514-0000779fd18c.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (observing while Russia justified 2008 attack on Georgia as “humanitarian
intervention,” others saw attack as “deliberate exercise to reassert effective Russian control
over former Soviet territory”).
5. Security Council delegates from China, Brazil, South Africa, and Nicaragua have
each voiced grave concerns that the protection of civilians could be used, in the words of
the Brazilian representative, “as a smokescreen for intervention or regime change.” U.N.
SCOR, 66th Sess., 6531st mtg. at 11, 17–18, 20, 34, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6531 (May 10, 2011)
(describing remarks, respectively, from representatives of Brazil, South Africa, China, and
Nicaragua).
6. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention];
Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land and its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
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scribes that, unless absolutely prevented, the occupying state ought to
interfere only minimally with the governing structure of the occupied
state.7 Consequently, where the objective of the use of force is to trans-
form the government of the occupied state, these conventions appear to
provide little guidance.8
A clear framework of legal obligations with which intervening states
must comply in regime-change missions is developing, but has yet to be
articulated fully.9 This legal ambiguity concerning responsibility during
the postconflict phase and for the installation of a successor regime may
further reinforce the willingness of political officials to engage in regime-
change operations. If politics is a short-term game, regime change is a
short-term solution—erase the problem of the targeted, pernicious re-
gime, bask in the glory, and leave the aftermath to the marooned pop-
ulation without any apparent legal consequence.10
This Article argues that a different approach is now required.
Guided by certain general principles of international law and the increas-
ing recognition of the importance of representative government and the
universality of human rights, international actors have, through their
recent practice of transformational international administration, up-
dated and modified the original minimalist orientation of the Hague and
Geneva framework. According to the general rule on treaty interpreta-
tion laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
7. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 64; Hague Regulations, supra note
6, art. 43.
8. See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 842, 849
(2003) (“Occupation law was never designed for such transforming exercises.”); Carsten
Stahn, ‘Jus Ad Bellum’, ‘Jus In Bello’ . . . ‘Jus Post Bellum’?—Rethinking the Conception
of the Law of Armed Force, 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 921, 928 (2006) (“The law of occupation, the
only branch of the jus in bello which deals explicitly with post-conflict relations, is ill-suited
to serve as a framework of administration.”).
9. See, e.g., Kristen E. Boon, Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus
Post Bellum, 31 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 57, 57 (2009) (noting coalescence around
necessity of building representative institutions, but claiming there is “no uniform legal
framework regulating transitions from conflict to peace”); see also Eric De Brabandere,
Post-Conflict Administrations in International Law: International Territorial
Administration, Transitional Authority and Foreign Occupation in Theory and Practice
99–100 (2009) [hereinafter De Brabandere, Post-Conflict Administrations] (noting
possibility of “emerging customary obligation” but arguing there is insufficient practice “to
establish a customary legal obligation relative to the application of human rights to
transitional administrations”); Gregory H. Fox, Humanitarian Occupation 197–98 (2008)
[hereinafter Fox, Humanitarian Occupation] (arguing customary international law does
not yet support right to humanitarian occupation); Adam Roberts, Transformative Military
Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 580, 621
(2006) [hereinafter Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation] (“[C]ustom with
respect to the law on occupations has undergone significant evolution.”).
10. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad
Idea, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 516, 522–23 (2004) (“[O]nce a regime has been ejected and the
territory controlled, the regime changers cannot say ‘mission accomplished’ and fly off.”).
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Treaties, this subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the par-
ties indicates the emergence of a twofold obligation.11
First, regime change triggers a legal obligation on the intervening
state or states to establish security in the host territory, promote repre-
sentative local government, ensure the protection of human rights, assist
with postconflict reconstruction, and safeguard minority groups. Second,
the interveners must also ensure that the successor regime, whose instal-
lation their military intervention and subsequent exercise of control over
the territory facilitated, respects international human rights law.
Critics may well argue that the first part of the obligation attempts to
impose rigid legal responsibility onto operations that are inherently
context-specific and that the second raises questions of attribution and
the proper focus (whether on the intervening states or the successor
regime) of responsibility for repression.12
These objections may be addressed here in a preliminary fashion.
Though the acts by which the intervening state discharges the obligation
may well shift to take account of the demands of the particular context,
11. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The International Law
Commission (ILC) made clear in its commentaries on the Draft Articles on the Law of
Treaties that “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty . . . constitutes objective
evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty.” Reps. of the
Int’l Law Comm’n, 2d part of 17th Sess., Jan. 3–28, 1966, & 18th Sess., May 4–19, 1966, at
52, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1; GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 9 (1966) [hereinafter
Commentaries on Draft Articles]. Further, the Commission noted that every state party
need not have engaged in the practice and instead “it suffices that it should have accepted
the practice.” Id. at 52–53. In its more recent consideration of the topic, the ILC has
observed that subsequent practice under Article 31(3)(b) “consists of conduct in the
application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty.” Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 65th Sess., May
6–June 7, July 8–Aug. 9, 2013, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/68/10; GAOR, 68th Sess., Supp. No. 10
(2013). This subsequent conduct
includes not only official acts at the international or at the internal level which
serve to apply the treaty, including to respect or to ensure the fulfillment of
treaty obligations, but also, inter alia, official statements regarding its
interpretation, such as statements at a diplomatic conference, statements in the
course of a legal dispute, or judgments of domestic courts.
Id. at 35–36. Finally, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Delimitation Commission has
concluded that “the effect of subsequent conduct may be so clear in relation to matters
that appear to be the subject of a given treaty that the application of an otherwise
pertinent treaty provision may be varied, or may even cease to control the situation,
regardless of its original meaning.” Eritrea v. Fed. Democratic Republic of Eth., 25 R.I.A.A.
83, 110–11 (Eri.-Eth. Boundary Comm’n 2002).
12. See, e.g., Jane Stromseth et al., Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule of
Law After Military Interventions 91, 95 (2006) (noting postconflict rule of law missions
must be context-specific); Oisín Tansey, Regime-Building: Democratization and
International Administration 3 (2009) (“[I]t is domestic actors that determine final
regime outcomes.”).
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the overriding obligation itself does not.13 Thus, in international environ-
mental law, for example, an environmental impact assessment is now
recognized as an essential component of any major transboundary con-
struction project that may cause harm.14 Yet, it is also clear that the con-
tent of any such report will depend on the context of the terrain, the
nature of the project, and the magnitude of the risks.15 The obligation
articulated in this Article requires a similar endeavor on the part of the
intervening state or international organization when it is administering
territory and attempting to facilitate the installation of a successor
regime. Indeed, an assessment of the promotion of the objectives identi-
fied in this study as common to international territorial administration
missions ought to be conducted not only before military intervention is
initiated but also throughout the course of administration with regard to
exit planning and succession.16 Further, any such assessment must be car-
13. On obligations that may take account of context, see, e.g., Handyside v. United
Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976) (leaving states “margin of appreciation” to
mold European Convention on Human Rights to own national context).
14. E.g., Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 204
(Apr. 20) (“[I]t may now be considered a requirement under general international law to
undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in
particular, on a shared resource.”); see also Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17,
Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 11 ITLOS Rep. 10, ¶ 145 [hereinafter Responsibilities
and Obligations of States] (“It should be stressed that the obligation to conduct an
environmental impact assessment is a direct obligation under the Convention and a
general obligation under customary international law.”); Draft Articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries, Rep. of the Int’l Law
Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, ch. V art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
[hereinafter Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm]; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 370, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
2001/Add.1 (pt. 2) (“Any decision in respect of the authorization of an activity within the
scope of the present articles, shall, in particular, be based on an assessment of the possible
transboundary harm caused by that activity, including any environmental impact
assessment.”).
15. The International Court of Justice (ICJ or “the Court”) has made it clear that it
should be left to each individual state “to determine in its domestic legislation or in the
authorization process for the project, the specific content of the environmental impact
assessment required in each case.” Pulp Mills on River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. ¶ 205. In doing
so, the state must “hav[e] regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed
development and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well as to the need to
exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment.” Id.
16. For discussion of this point in the context of transboundary environmental harm
and the necessity of a due diligence assessment, see Draft Articles on Transboundary
Harm, supra note 14, ch. V art. 3, at 393, which states that “[i]n the context of the present
articles, due diligence is manifested in reasonable efforts by a State to inform itself of
factual and legal components that relate foreseeably to a contemplated procedure and to
take appropriate measures in timely fashion, to address them.” Those Draft Articles would
create “an obligation to take unilateral measures to prevent significant transboundary
harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof arising out of activities within the scope
of article 1,” which covers lawful activities in international law that nonetheless involve a
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ried out with diligence and care for the population with whose tempo-
rary management the intervening power has been entrusted.17
The second objection concerning the attribution of bad acts of the
successor regime combines questions of control and appropriate policy.
As will be explained later in more detail, occupation law, the law of state
responsibility, and international criminal law each affirm that a state or
individual need not directly cause the injury to which liability is attached
if it exercises control over the wrongful actor or substantially contributes
to the wrongful act.18 A showing that the intervening state or administer-
ing international organization did not adequately discharge its obligation
to ensure the installation of a suitable successor regime is based on the
state or international organization’s control over the territory in
question.
Further, because of contemporary negative connotations associated
with ‘occupation,’ states are increasingly either handing administration
in postconflict settings to domestic transitional administrations (over
which the intervening state retains significant control) or to international
organizations.19 Even though postconflict administration is not always
openly exercised solely by the intervening state, that state often retains a
sufficiently high level of control to justify the attachment of responsibility
for the actions of the successor regime.20 As the degree of control lessens,
so too does the extent of responsibility. However, irrespective of the level
of control exercised, the intervening state still may be held liable for
wrongful acts of the successor regime in which the intervening state is
complicit.21
risk of causing significant transboundary harm. Id. This obligation could be met by “first,
formulating policies designed to prevent significant transboundary harm or to minimize
the risk thereof and, second, implementing those policies.” Id.
17. See, e.g., Pulp Mills on River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. ¶ 204 (“[D]ue diligence, and the
duty of vigilance and prevention which it implies, would not be considered to have been
exercised, if a party planning works liable to affect the régime of the river . . . did not
undertake an environmental impact assessment on the potential effects of such works.”);
Responsibilities and Obligations of States, supra note 14, ¶ 117 (noting “standard of due
diligence has to be more severe for the riskier activities”); Bartram S. Brown, Intervention,
Self-Determination, Democracy and the Residual Responsibilities of the Occupying Power
in Iraq, 11 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 23, 53 (2004) (“[A] state which elects to intervene
forcibly for humanitarian purposes is subject to a duty of care not to make the situation
worse than it would have been.”).
18. Infra Part IV (discussing theories of state responsibility).
19. See, e.g., Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 40–41, at 316–17 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Kooijmans,
J.) (noting occupying states “feel more and more inclined to make use of arrangements
where authority is said to be exercised by transitional governments or rebel movements”).
20. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing Russia’s decisive influence over authorities of
Transdniestria territory and imputation of responsibility accordingly).
21. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, ch. IV,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 [hereinafter ARSIWA]; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001),
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With these preliminary objections addressed, the path of the argu-
ment will proceed along the following course. Part I briefly discusses the
original minimalist orientation of international humanitarian law and
highlights its ultimate inadequacy for the supervision of interventions
whose objective is the transformation of the governing structure of the
occupied state. However, to say that international actors have gone be-
yond the scope of the formal law of occupation does not establish a
framework of accountability for actions taken in this regard.
Instead, Part II posits that the development of the law of postconflict
responsibilities has been guided by various general principles of interna-
tional law as well as by the permeation of international human rights law
throughout international law.22 This Part discusses the legal relationship
between intervener and host population and the obligations derived
therefrom as incorporating elements of several legal formulations: trus-
teeship, a positive obligation to ensure respect for international law or to
prevent violations, and the responsibility to rebuild within the doctrine
of the responsibility to protect.
Part III examines several recent regime-change missions as evidence
of the crystallization of an obligation (not merely an option) to do more
than is demanded by the express terms of the Hague and Geneva reg-
imes. In this Part, particular occupation and international transitional
administration projects are examined and the commonalities among
them highlighted. This state practice is then combined with expressions
of international support to show the emergence of an evolving treaty
obligation in this area.
Part IV considers whether the intervener’s responsibility for acts of
the successor regime may comport with understandings of third party
obligations in general international law and the extent to which such
responsibility may be limited by the control or influence that the inter-
vening state or international organization exercises.
Finally, Part V discusses the implications of the twofold obligation
posited herein and the extent to which such concerns are reconcilable or
represent ongoing normative conflicts in the practice of international
law.
It may also prove useful to note what will not appear in these pages.
This Article is not a discourse on the lawfulness, legitimacy, or fairness of
intervention or regime change writ large. Instead, this Article focuses on
the aftermath of the regime-change operation and argues that the obli-
gations of the intervening state or states under international law must be
reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1
(pt. 2) (listing limited situations in which one state is responsible for direct acts of another
state).
22. General principles of law are a well-established source of international law. See
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 (stating
ICJ “shall apply . . . general principles of law”).
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further articulated in order to ensure accountability and decision pro-
cesses through which international officials are forced to consider the
long-term costs and consequences of such operations.
Several decades ago, Tom Franck drew attention to the erosion of
the U.N. Charter as an absolute barrier to the use of force by asking,
“Who killed Article 2(4)?”23 While Franck’s position remains hotly con-
tested, it is clear from the number of military interventions that appear to
lack formal authorization that states may regard Article 2(4) as some-
thing less than an unbending ban. In this context, the precise articula-
tion of legally binding obligations of reconstruction and administration
that states must discharge may well prove a useful step in further de-
biasing overly optimistic political officials who seek to advance strategic
ambitions through quick regime change.24
I. MINIMALIST OCCUPATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Commentators have long regarded major changes to the form or
structure of government of an occupied state as expressly forbidden by
the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949.25 These international agreements are together expressive of
customary international law.26 The Hague Regulations reflect the under-
standing that the authority of the occupant to govern is less legitimate
than that of the local administration of the occupied state. Therefore, its
Article 43 declares:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into
the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures
23. Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the
Use of Force by States, 64 Am. J. Int’l L. 809, 809 (1970); see also Oil Platforms (Iran v.
U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 6, at 328 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Simma, J.)
(“[O]utside the courtroom . . . legal justification of use of force within the system of the
United Nations Charter is discarded even as a fig leaf, while an increasing number of
writers appear to prepare for the outright funeral of international legal limitations on the
use of force.”).
24. See, e.g., Interview by Tim Russert with Dick Cheney, Vice President, on Meet the
Press (NBC television broadcast Mar. 16, 2003), transcript available at https://www.mt
holyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/cheneymeetthepress.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (asserting, with regard to United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, “my belief is
we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators”).
25. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied Territory in
International Law, in International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories:
Two Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 241, 247 (Emma
Playfair ed., 1992) (stating both Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva Convention
prohibit changes in law of occupied territory “unless they are required for the legitimate
needs of the occupation”).
26. See, e.g., Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 75 (July 8) (noting both agreements embody customary international
humanitarian law); Partial Award: Central Front—Ethiopia’s Claim 2 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26
R.I.A.A. 155, 157 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2004) (noting “customary international law of
armed conflict” is “exemplified” by both agreements).
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in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country.27
Consequently, occupying states that attempt to change the constitution
or political form of the occupied state merely by virtue of the former’s
superior military strength exercise more power than is granted them by
the express terms of the treaty law of occupation.28
Despite this apparent prohibition, states have, at times, relied on
Article 43’s “unless absolutely prevented” exception to make changes to a
governing structure that is either at odds with the humanitarian ethos of
the law of occupation or that might conflict directly with the require-
ment that they reestablish public order. Yet, such attempts have not al-
ways been accepted universally. Indeed, although the Allied Powers
relied on the impossibility of continuing the inherently discriminatory
legislation and repressive forms of government common to the Axis
states that they occupied at the end of the Second World War to justify
the sweeping reforms introduced, contemporary commentators alleged
that the implementation of such changes exceeded the formal bounds of
the Hague Regulations.29
Cognizant of the formal limitations in the law of occupation and
eager to move the transformative ideals of the postwar reformative occu-
pations out of the realm of exceptions and into standard practice author-
ized explicitly by future treaty arrangements concerning occupation, the
U.S. delegation to the conference negotiating the Geneva Conventions
recommended a change that would have expanded the occupant’s role
in the transformation of the governing structure of the occupied terri-
tory.30 The Soviet Union strongly opposed this suggestion, noting that it
“gave the Occupying Power an absolute right to modify the penal legisla-
tion of the occupied territory” and that “[s]uch a right greatly exceeded
the limited right laid down in the Hague Regulations.”31 The Mexican
27. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 43.
28. See, e.g., 4 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Geneva
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War 273
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC Commentary on Convention (IV)] (noting
such changes “were incompatible with the traditional concept of occupation (as defined in
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907) according to which the occupying authority
was to be considered as merely being a de facto administrator”).
29. Id. (noting Allied occupations during World War II violated Article 43 of the
1907 Hague Regulations’ prohibition on interference by an occupying power); see also
R.Y. Jennings, Government in Commission, 1946 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 112, 136 (noting
attempt to apply law of belligerent occupation to occupied territories post-World War II
“would be a manifest anachronism” because “whole raison d’être of the law of belligerent
occupation is absent in the circumstances of the Allied occupation of Germany”).
30. 2A Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva of 1949, at 670 (1950)
(noting U.S. attempt to amend convention to give occupying powers greater ability to
overturn laws of occupied territory); 3 id. at 139 (providing amendment text).
31. 2A id. at 670; see also id. at 671 (noting argument, by delegate of Monaco, that
U.S. proposal “would not hold good as a general rule,” and observation, by delegate of
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delegation put forward a compromise solution that the occupant “could
only modify the legislation of an occupied territory if the legislation in
question violated the principles of the ‘Universal Declaration of the
Rights of Man,’”32 but the Conference did not approve this formulation.
Thus, the text of the Fourth Geneva Convention largely mirrors the
minimalist approach of the Hague Regulations. Occupants are to change
as little concerning the applicable domestic law and government of the
territory as possible.33 Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention there-
fore affirms that “[t]he penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain
in force” and that “the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue
to function in respect of all offences covered by the said laws.”34 The em-
phasis is on the continuity of the legal system as a whole, such that the
explicit reference to “penal laws” does not allow by inference the occu-
pant to interfere with the civil law of the occupied state.35 However,
Article 64 expands upon the “unless absolutely prevented” exception to
Article 43 and declares that the occupant may make alterations where
not doing so would “constitute a threat to [the Occupying Power’s] secu-
rity or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention.”36
The Hague and Geneva regimes also include many provisions for
the protection of the civilian population of the occupied territory and for
the satisfaction of their basic humanitarian needs. Occupiers must not
only refrain from pillage and forced military service; they must also pro-
vide medical care and basic education for the civilian population.37 In-
deed, Eyal Benvenisti has gone so far as to describe the Hague and
Geneva framework as “a rudimentary bill of rights for the occupied
population.”38
This Article, however, is less about these well-established obligations
and more concerned with shifts in international practice concerning the
alteration of the governing structure of the occupied state. In recent
years, states have consistently moved beyond the express terms of the
Hague and Geneva regime to introduce sweeping reforms in the after-
Norway, that it would be “retrogressive step” as “it gave the impression that the Occupying
Power could change the legislation of the occupied territory as it thought fit”).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., ICRC Commentary on Convention (IV), supra note 28, at 335 (“Article
64 expresses, in a more precise and detailed form, the terms of Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations, which lays down that the Occupying Power is to respect the laws in force in
the country ‘unless absolutely prevented.’” (quoting Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art.
43)).
34. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 64.
35. Cf. ICRC Commentary on Convention (IV), supra note 28, at 335 (arguing desire
for continuity applies with equal force to civil laws and “there is no reason to infer”
interference with civil law is allowed under convention).
36. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 64.
37. Id. arts. 50–51, 56; Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 47.
38. Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation 12 (2d ed. 2012).
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math of military intervention.39 The coalescence and general approval
(perhaps not in the run-up to intervention, but certainly at the conclu-
sion of hostilities) of these expansive reform projects have now come to
represent not merely an option to undertake restructuring beyond the
formal confines of the law of occupation but an international obligation
to do so.
Accordingly, the next Part considers how the turn from strict mini-
malism has been affected by the permeation of human rights throughout
international law and the recognition of certain general principles of
international law that have guided understandings of the law in this area.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, AND GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although the Mexican proposal to allow occupiers to amend legisla-
tion of the occupied state that violated international human rights stand-
ards was rejected at the negotiating conference for the Geneva
Conventions,40 international law in the last several decades has increas-
ingly embraced the universality and ever-presence of international
human rights law. Indeed, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
has recognized that the State “has the obligation, at all times, to apply
procedures that are in accordance with the law and to respect the fun-
damental rights of each individual in its jurisdiction,”41 and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ or “the Court”) has affirmed that
human rights guarantees obtain even in times of armed conflict.42
Further, the ICJ has made clear that in situations of occupation, the
occupier has a duty to ensure the protection of the human rights of the
occupied population.43
Concurrently, the international community has increasingly recog-
nized representative government or democracy as an international
ideal.44 Secretaries-General of the United Nations have, for the past
39. See, e.g., infra Part III.B (describing examples of military intervention in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Kosovo, East Timor, and Libya).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32 (detailing United States, Soviet Union,
and Mexico proposals during negotiations).
41. Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 70, ¶ 174 (Nov. 25, 2000).
42. E.g., Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9) [hereinafter Consequences of
Construction, ICJ Advisory Opinion] (“[T]he Court considers that the protection offered
by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict . . . .”).
43. E.g., Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 179–180, 211 (Dec. 19) (finding Uganda did not meet
obligations to ensure human rights in territory it occupied).
44. See, e.g., Fox, Humanitarian Occupation, supra note 9, at 154 (“[I]nternational
law has now adopted liberal democracy as the preferred model of national governance.”);
see also Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, G.A. Res. 55/96, at 1, U.N. Doc.
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twenty years, consistently promoted democracy as the mode of govern-
ance most compatible with international peace,45 and, in recognition of
this conclusion, states agreed following the 2005 World Summit to the
establishment of the U.N. Democracy Fund to promote and build domes-
tic democratic institutions.46 Thus, even while the initial use of force
remains controversial and though many states may not number within
this democratic category, it is clear that the preferred outcome in the
postwar period (when local administration must be rebuilt) is a stable,
democratic administration for the occupied territory.47
This Part considers how certain general principles of international
law have developed in a manner so as to support the reorientation of
postconflict responsibilities away from the administrative minimalism of
the express Hague and Geneva text and toward a modern system that
obliges international actors engaged in military intervention to promote
the international ideals of human rights and representative government.
Part III then illustrates the application of these general principles
through the consideration of recent practice.
International courts and tribunals have long accepted that the pre-
cise meaning of treaty terms may, according to the prevailing legal con-
text, shift over time.48 Indeed, the ICJ has declared that “the Court must
A/RES/55/96 (Feb. 28, 2001) (recognizing link between protection of human rights and
democracy).
45. E.g., U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 151, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005
(Mar. 21, 2005) (“The United Nations does more than any other single organization to
promote and strengthen democratic institutions and practices around the world . . . .”);
U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Dec. 17, 1996 from the Secretary-General addressed
to the President of the General Assembly, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/51/761 (Dec. 20, 1996)
(observing “[d]emocratic institutions and processes . . . minimiz[e] the risk that
differences or disputes will erupt into armed conflict or confrontation” and “[i]n this way,
a culture of democracy is fundamentally a culture of peace”).
46. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 136, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1
(Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome].
47. Thus, for example, even though states castigated the United States for its invasion
of Iraq in 2003 as an unlawful use of force, it was not suggested that the United States and
its allies simply allow the Ba’athists to return to power. See, e.g., infra Part III.C (discussing
general consensus of need to aid in rebuilding new governments in Afghanistan and Iraq).
48. E.g., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) No. 16, ¶ 114 (Oct. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Right to Information, IACHR Advisory
Opinion] (“[H]uman rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must
consider the changes over time and present-day conditions.”); Loizidou v. Turkey
(Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1995) (characterizing
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as “living
instrument”); see also Special Rapporteur on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent
Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, First Report on Subsequent
Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty Interpretation, Int’l Law
Comm’n, ¶¶ 36–39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/660 (Mar. 19, 2013) (by Georg Nolte)
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur on Treaties] (describing various courts’ approach to
interpretation of treaties in light of Vienna Convention).
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take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the super-
vening half-century,” that “its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by
the subsequent development of law,” and that “an international instru-
ment has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the
entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.”49 Further,
the court has stated that “where the parties have used generic terms in a
treaty, the parties necessarily [have] been aware that the meaning of the
terms was likely to evolve over time,” and that “where the treaty has been
entered into for a very long period or is ‘of continuing duration’, the
parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those
terms to have an evolving meaning.”50 Similarly, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights has affirmed that “‘when interpreting a treaty,
not only the agreements and instruments formally related to it should be
taken into consideration (Article 31.2 of the Vienna Convention), but
also the system within which it is (inscribed) (Article 31.3).’”51
It is through this method of “evolutive interpretation,” as the Inter-
American Court has termed it, that this Article considers developments
in international law subsequent to the conclusion of the Hague and
Geneva agreements that have operated to modify understandings con-
cerning their requirements.52
A. Trusteeship
States and international organizations have, for many decades, used
trusteeship as a legal device through which to administer a territory and,
on occasion, prepare its institutions for full independence.53 Yet, trustee-
49. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 53 (June 21).
50. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 213, ¶ 66 (July 13).
51. “Street Children” (Villagran-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 192 (Nov. 19, 1999) (quoting Right to Information,
IACHR Advisory Opinion, supra note 48, ¶ 113).
52. Id. ¶ 193 (quoting Right to Information, IACHR Advisory Opinion, supra note
48, ¶ 114).
53. See, e.g., U.N. Charter ch. XII (establishing requirements, procedures, and goals
for establishing trusteeships under U.N. authority); League of Nations Covenant art. 22
(establishing rules and procedures for League-mandated trusteeship). See generally Ralph
Wilde, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing
Mission Never Went Away (2008) [hereinafter Wilde, Territorial Administration]
(discussing policy considerations behind international administration of territories); W.
Michael Reisman, Reflections on State Responsibility for Violations of Explicit
Protectorate, Mandate, and Trusteeship Obligations, 10 Mich. J. Int’l L. 231 (1989)
(describing state trusteeship responsibilities); Ralph Wilde, From Trusteeship to Self-
Determination and Back Again: The Role of the Hague Regulations in the Evolution of
International Trusteeship, and the Framework of Rights and Duties of Occupying Powers,
31 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 85 (2009) (comparing trusteeship with other forms of
administration of territory by “foreign and international actors”).
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ship has fallen out of favor in the postcolonial period with many states
that were once colonies viewing the legal construct as an excuse for con-
tinued imperialism. The U.N. Trusteeship Council that once supervised
the administration of trust territories is now defunct.54 Further, Article 78
of the Charter expressly forbids the application of the United Nations’s
trusteeship system to any U.N. member.55 Yet, the strong similarities to
trusteeship in the aftermath of regime-change operations, wherein
foreign officials are tasked with the administration of territory and claim
to act in the interests of the local population, require that the principle
be considered. Indeed, Adam Roberts, in a comment that could equally
be applied to international transitional administration, has observed that
“the idea of ‘trusteeship’ is implicit in all occupation law.”56
Under the former trusteeship system, states took on the responsibili-
ties of trusteeship voluntarily. Chapter XII of the U.N. Charter provided
for the conclusion of a trusteeship agreement between the administering
state and the Trusteeship Council.57 The application of trusteeship to
regime-change operations may, therefore, be constructive insofar as the
act of toppling the foreign regime triggers the imposition on the inter-
vening state of certain duties toward the affected population.58 The de-
scriptor “constructive” is also appropriate given the important role of the
Security Council in mandating (through Chapter VII binding resolution)
the duties to be fulfilled by modern occupation or international admin-
istration operations.59 Indeed, many of the duties imposed by the
Security Council reflect those applicable in trusteeship arrangements as
specified in Article 76 of the Charter—namely, the furtherance of inter-
national peace and security, promotion of political and economic ad-
vancement, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.60
As such, the duties to promote human rights, ensure security, establish
democratic institutions, and assist in reconstruction that states and inter-
54. See, e.g., 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 46, ¶ 176 (proposing
deletion of Chapter XIII of Charter and any reference to Trusteeship Council in Chapter
XII). But cf. Saira Mohamed, Note, From Keeping Peace to Building Peace: A Proposal for
a Revitalized United Nations Trusteeship Council, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 812 (2005)
(calling for revival of trusteeship system).
55. U.N. Charter art. 78.
56. Adam Roberts, What Is a Military Occupation?, 1985 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 249, 295.
57. U.N. Charter arts. 77, 79, 81.
58. See, e.g., Kristen E. Boon & Philip M. Moremen, Foreword to Symposium, When
the Fighting Stops: Roles and Responsibilities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 38 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 1233, 1247 (2008) (“It is generally accepted that actors engaged in
governance functions in post-conflict reconstruction have fiduciary-like duties to the
occupants.”).
59. See, e.g., infra Part III (examining recent regime change missions as evidence of
crystallization of obligations to go beyond express legal constraints of Hague and Geneva
regime).
60. U.N. Charter art. 76 (stating basic objectives and guiding principles of trusteeship
system); see also infra Part III (discussing relevant Security Council resolutions).
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national organizations have assumed in the wake of forcible, external
regime change seem to demonstrate a sense of obligation toward the
beneficiary population akin to the principle of trusteeship.
B. Obligation to Ensure and Obligation to Prevent
States are under an obligation in several areas of international law
not merely to perform certain functions but also to promote compliance
with those obligations by other states and nonstate entities.61 Thus,
Common Article 1 of the Geneva Convention declares that “[t]he High
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the
present Convention in all circumstances.”62 Further, Common Article 1
of the Genocide Convention states that “[t]he Contracting Parties con-
firm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of
war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent
and to punish.”63
Obligations to ensure also apply when states are transferring terri-
tory or individuals to the control of another entity. Thus, shortly before
the United Kingdom (a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)) was due to return administration of Hong
Kong to the People’s Republic of China (not a party to the ICCPR), the
United Kingdom and China concluded agreements through which China
pledged that the Covenant would be observed in Hong Kong even after
the handover.64 Noting this agreement and the responsibility of the
United Kingdom in this regard, the Human Rights Committee urged the
United Kingdom “to take all necessary steps to ensure effective and con-
tinued application of the provisions of the Covenant in the territory of
Hong Kong in accordance with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
[concluded between the United Kingdom and China].”65
Similarly, in the individual context, the European Court of Human
Rights held in the case of Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v. United Kingdom that the
United Kingdom had violated Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights when U.K. troops in Iraq surrendered the complainants,
Iraqi nationals in U.K. custody, to Iraqi authorities without proper assur-
61. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, The Continuing Occupation?: Issues of Joint and
Several Liability and Effective Control, in The Iraq War and International Law 161, 164
(Phil Shiner & Andrew Williams eds., 2008) (noting example of states “accept[ing]
positive obligation to ensure the application of the treaty standards by another state”).
62. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
63. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
64. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Hong Kong), ¶ 5,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.69 (Nov. 8, 1996).
65. Id. ¶ 7; see also Benvenisti, supra note 38, at 88 (discussing this incident).
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ances that the complainants would not be put to death.66 The Court
rejected the United Kingdom’s argument that the United Kingdom had
an overriding obligation to surrender Iraqi nationals in Iraq to the gov-
ernment of Iraq by virtue of Iraq’s sovereignty.67 Instead, the Court aff-
irmed that “the respondent State’s armed forces, having entered Iraq,
took active steps to bring the applicants within the United Kingdom’s
jurisdiction, by arresting them and holding them in British-run detention
facilities” and that under such circumstances “the respondent State was
under a paramount obligation to ensure that the arrest and detention
did not end in a manner which would breach the applicants’ rights.”68
While the exact content of these obligations to ensure or to prevent
remains uncertain, it is clear at the very least that they require that states
cannot aid, encourage, or otherwise positively contribute to violations by
others of the Conventions listed. Thus, in the Paramilitary Activities Case
(Nicaragua v. United States), the ICJ held that the obligation to ensure
respect derives “from the general principles of humanitarian law,” which
mandate that the respondent state was “under an obligation not to
encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act
in violation of the provisions of Article 3 common to the four 1949
Geneva Conventions.”69 Further, in the Wall advisory opinion, the Court
wrote that Common Article 1 required that “every State party to that
Convention, whether or not it is a party to a specific conflict, is under an
obligation to ensure that the requirements of the instruments in ques-
tion are complied with.”70 Consequently, the Court advised that “all
States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation re-
sulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory,” that “[t]hey are also under an obligation not to render aid or
assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction,”
and that “the States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are
under an obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and
international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international
humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.”71
With regard to the Genocide Convention’s obligation to prevent
genocide, the Court held that “the obligation in question is one of con-
duct and not one of result” and that “the obligation of States parties is
rather to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent
66. 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 59.
67. Id. at 57.
68. Id. at 58 (citation omitted).
69. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 220 (June 27).
70. Consequences of Construction, ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 42, ¶ 158.
71. Id. ¶ 159.
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genocide so far as possible.”72 The Court found that a determination of
whether “a State has duly discharged the obligation concerned” will
depend on “the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons
likely to commit, or already committing, genocide” and that this capacity
to influence would in turn depend on “the geographical distance of the
State concerned from the scene of the events, and on the strength of the
political links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the authorities
of that State and the main actors in the events.”73
Thus, the obligation to ensure respect appears to require that states
not take positive actions to contribute to the violation of the provisions of
international law in question and that this obligation is a general duty on
all states, regardless of whether that state is a party to the particular con-
flict or is in some other special position. Further, this obligation also
applies when one state is required to obtain assurances that the rights
guarantees previously in place will continue to be observed by the succes-
sor entity. On the other hand, the obligation to prevent is to be imposed
only on a state that has some special connection or influence over the
actor that stands ready to commit a violation, and this obligation requires
the state in such a special position to take all measures reasonably avail-
able to it to prevent the violation.
In the context of contemporary regime-change operations, each
principle may apply to the international community of states as a whole
or simply to the intervening state.74 Indeed, the obligation to ensure re-
spect may encompass a duty on all states either to deny support to suc-
cessor regimes that are oppressive or to take measures to ensure that
international organizations administering territory act in ways that are in
compliance with obligations to ensure respect that their member states
have undertaken. Conversely, an obligation to prevent human rights vio-
lations may be incumbent upon the intervening state because of its spe-
cial influence over the regime that it installs in the formerly occupied
state or territory.
C. Responsibility to Rebuild
The responsibility to rebuild, as formulated by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, requires that where
military intervention has been undertaken “there should be a genuine
commitment to helping to build a durable peace, and promoting good
72. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 430 (Feb. 26).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 38, at 57, 87 (discussing occupying force’s
obligations to civilian population to ensure continuation of “public order and civil life”).
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governance and sustainable development.”75 In addition to peace build-
ing, the Commission’s final report highlights the reestablishment of basic
security,76 the facilitation of transitional justice and reconciliation,77 and
the promotion of development as essential features of this new notion of
a responsibility to rebuild.78 The report also advocates the “constructive
adaptation of Chapter XII of the U.N. Charter,” which laid down the
rules of the international trusteeship system, so as to “enable reconstruc-
tion and rehabilitation to take place in an orderly way across the full
spectrum, with the support and assistance of the international
community.”79
Though the 2005 World Summit Outcome does not mention the
responsibility to rebuild explicitly, it does recommend the formation of a
U.N. Peacebuilding Commission to oversee postconflict transitional ar-
rangements and endorses the establishment of a U.N. Democracy Fund
in order to support initiatives aimed at strengthening democratic gov-
ernance worldwide.80 In this manner, the international community
institutionalized the promotion of stable government and gave the sup-
port of the United Nations to such endeavors. Indeed, the establishment
of these two organizational mechanisms may be viewed as evidence of
states’ implicit adoption of a general responsibility to rebuild in post-
conflict situations.
III. SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIVE OCCUPATION, AND
INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION
Throughout the Cold War, a number of occupations subsequent to
military intervention deviated significantly from the minimalist under-
standings of the Hague and Geneva regime. However, each sparked an
international outcry from one grouping of states or another for reasons
of geopolitical contestation and purported violations of the right of self-
determination of the occupied population. Thus, the Soviet Union’s mil-
itary intervention in Hungary, through which it replaced one govern-
ment with another more friendly to Soviet interests, was decried by the
U.N. General Assembly, with a Special Committee of the General
Assembly labeling the Soviet invasion an act of aggression contrary to
international law.81 Similarly, the international community criticized the
75. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention & State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect,
¶ 5.1 (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
76. Id. ¶ 5.8.
77. Id. ¶ 5.13.
78. Id. ¶ 5.19.
79. Id. ¶ 5.22.
80. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 46, ¶¶ 97–105, 136.
81. Rep. of the Special Comm. on the Problem of Hung., ¶¶ 366–367, 785, 1957,
U.N. Doc. A/3592; GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 18 (1957) (finding Soviet Union guilty of
aggression); see also Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in
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Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, whereby the Soviet Union sought to
impose its own model of governance on Afghan society.82 American at-
tempts at regime change in various states, particularly in Latin America,
also met with international criticism.83 Moreover, the occupation projects
initiated and sustained by American allies throughout the Cold War—
namely, Israel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Turkey in Northern
Cyprus, and Morocco in Western Sahara—were each labeled in turn
unlawful and contrary to the right of self-determination of the popula-
tion of each occupied state or territory.84
Since the end of the Cold War, however, states and international
organizations have engaged in occupations that have attempted to bring
about governmental reforms in occupied territories that stretch far
beyond the formal bounds of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and
the international community as a whole has largely commended such
actors for doing so.85 This Part of the Article, therefore, first defines the
an Evolving World Order 89 (1996) (describing Soviet reason for intervention as “not
convincing” because “[e]ven if an invitation by Hungarian government existed,” consent
was eventually withdrawn); Brad Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law
265–66 (1999) (describing events surrounding intervention in Hungary and General
Assembly’s response to intervention).
82. See, e.g., G.A. Res. ES-6/2, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-6/2 (Jan. 14, 1980) (noting
General Assembly “[s]trongly deplores the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan, which
is inconsistent” with principle of “respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of every State”); Benvenisti, supra note 38, at 179 (describing
international criticism of Soviet invasion).
83. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 268 (June 27) (“[T]he protection of human rights . . . cannot be
compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction of oil installations, or again with the
training, arming and equipping of the contras. . . . [T]he preservation of human rights in
Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the United States . . . .”).
84. See, e.g., Consequences of Construction, ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 42,
¶ 120 (concluding Israeli settlements in occupied territories “have been established in
breach of international law”); G.A. Res. 37/253, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/253 (May 13,
1983) (“Deploring the fact that part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is still
occupied by foreign forces . . . .”); Benvenisti, supra note 38, at 171–72 (describing
international criticism of Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara).
85. This Part considers both state occupation and postconflict territorial
administration by international organizations. Both have begun to advance important
transformational objectives and thus are treated together. In support of this approach, see
Steven R. Ratner, Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The
Challenges of Convergence, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 695, 697 (2005), which argues that the
“disconnect” between how “occupations and territorial administrations” have been
conceptualized and the “ways these missions are actually carried out” is collapsing because
the “two sorts of operations share a great deal, and lines separating them, adopted by
international elites and reflected in international law, are disappearing.” The United
Nations is not a party to the Hague or Geneva treaties, but it has voluntarily committed to
observe international humanitarian law. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s
Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, U.N.
Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999) (describing U.N. commitment to abide by
international humanitarian law). Further, by virtue of its international legal personality,
the United Nations is bound to act in accordance with the treaties to the extent that such
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terms of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties and then uses this provision as a basis to assert that states have
collectively renovated the minimalist obligations of the Hague and
Geneva framework through their recent practice of transformative
occupation.
A. Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Article 31(3)(b) provides that treaty obligations are to be inter-
preted taking into account “any subsequent practice in the application of
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation.”86 The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Special
Rapporteur on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in
Relation to Treaty Interpretation has defined “subsequent practice” as
“conduct, including pronouncements, by one or more parties to the
treaty after its conclusion regarding its interpretation or application.”87
Further, the ILC previously affirmed that, in order to establish general
agreement to a revised interpretation, all parties to the relevant treaties
(here, the Hague and Geneva agreements) need not have undertaken
the practice themselves, so long as the parties have acquiesced in that
subsequent practice.88 Thus, the ICJ has made clear that “the subsequent
practice of the parties, within the meaning of Article 31 (3) (b) of the
Vienna Convention, can result in a departure from the original intent on
the basis of a tacit agreement between the parties.”89
States may undertake this practice or indicate their agreement either
individually or collectively through international organizations. Indeed,
Rosalyn Higgins has affirmed that “the practice of states comprises their
collective acts as well as the total of their individual acts” and that
“[c]ollective acts of states, repeated by and acquiesced in by sufficient
numbers with sufficient frequency, eventually attain the status of law.”90
instruments embody customary international law. E.g., Interpretation of Agreement of 25
March 1951 Between WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, ¶ 37 (Dec. 20)
(“International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by
any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under
their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties.”).
86. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31(3)(b).
87. Special Rapporteur on Treaties, supra note 48, ¶ 118.
88. Commentaries on Draft Articles, supra note 11, at 53 (“[The Commission]
omitted the word ‘all’ merely to avoid any possible misconception that every party must
individually have engaged in the practice where it suffices that it should have accepted the
practice.”).
89. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 213, ¶ 64 (July 13); see also Special Rapporteur on Treaties, supra
note 48, ¶¶ 58–60 (“[A]ll judges in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua supported the conclusion that
an evolutive interpretation is possible if it is accompanied by a common subsequent
practice of the parties.”).
90. Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political
Organs of the United Nations 2 (1963).
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Similarly, Ian Brownlie has termed international organizations “forums
for state practice” and described General Assembly resolutions and
Security Council decisions as practice that “provides evidence of the state
of the law,”91 while José Alvarez has noted that international organiza-
tions “provide shortcuts to finding custom.”92
As such, changes in the conduct of states and the acquiescence of
other states to that modified conduct, whether demonstrated individually
or collectively through international organizations, may lead to a shift in
the meaning of treaty terms by operation of Article 31(3)(b) of the
Vienna Convention. It is with this understanding that this Part examines
recent practice for commonalities from which obligations may be de-
rived. It then highlights state acquiescence in this revised interpretation
of the responsibilities under the Hague and Geneva framework for states
that carry out regime-change operations.
B. Subsequent Practice
1. Iraq. — After the conclusion of the initial phase of hostilities in
Iraq, when it was clear that the United States-led coalition had toppled
the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein, the United States and United
Kingdom undertook to establish and support a Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) to exercise administrative functions in Iraq temporar-
ily.93 Led by American diplomat Paul Bremer, and largely staffed by
American personnel, the CPA appointed itself to govern Iraq for the
duration of the occupation.94 In response, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1483, wherein it took note of this development and mandated
that the law of occupation, “in particular the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907,” was to apply to “all con-
cerned” (namely, the foreign occupation forces in Iraq).95
However, the CPA implemented a series of reforms that stretched
far beyond anything allowed by the formal text of the Conventions refer-
91. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 691–92 (2008).
92. José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers 592 (2005); cf. Stefan
Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 175, 192 (2005)
(observing, in theory, “[l]egislation by the Security Council is a powerful instrument for
the maintenance of international peace and security,” but “[i]n practice . . . , Council
legislation is fraught with problems, the most significant being the lack of clarity of the
legislative acts and the question of implementation”).
93. Permanent Reps. of the United Kingdom and United States to the U.N., Letter
dated May 8, 2003 from the Permanent Reps. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8, 2003).
94. E.g., Regulation No. 1, § 1 (May 16, 2003) (Coalition Provisional Authority) [The
Interim Iraqi Government] (“The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in
order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional
administration . . . .”).
95. S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
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enced by the Security Council.96 The CPA immediately sought to excise
from the administration of Iraq the policies and personnel of the Ba’ath
party regime. Order 1 of the CPA dissolved the party, removed senior
party members from government positions, and banned them from
future employment in the public sector.97 Order 2 dissolved various
institutions of the Iraqi government, including the Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Information, Ministry of State for Military Affairs, Army, Navy,
Air Force, and National Assembly.98 The CPA then promulgated signifi-
cant revisions to the Iraqi Penal Code (suspending, inter alia, the use of
the death penalty, prohibiting torture, and modifying sentences for other
offences),99 modified Iraq’s taxation structure (mandating that the top
tax rate not exceed fifteen percent),100 overhauled its banking system,101
implemented a new traffic code,102 amended its copyright law in line with
“current internationally-reconized standards of protection,”103 reformed
its laws concerning the management of public finances,104 and imposed
an extraordinarily liberal new regime to open Iraq to foreign invest-
ment.105 In order to promote further governance reforms, the CPA also
established a new Ministry of Human Rights tasked with the promotion
96. See, e.g., Fox, Humanitarian Occupation, supra note 9, at 260 (observing CPA
“enact[ed] a set of reforms so broad that it is no exaggeration to describe them as a social
engineering project”); Adam Roberts, The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004, 54 Int’l &
Comp. L.Q. 27, 36 (2005) (“[I]t is evident that some legal pronouncements of the CPA go
far beyond what is envisaged in the law of The Hague and Geneva.”).
97. De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society, Order No. 1 (May 16, 2003) (Coalition
Provisional Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government].
98. Dissolution of Entities, Order No. 2 (May 23, 2003) (Coalition Provisional
Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government].
99. Modifications of Penal Code and Criminal Proceedings Law, Order No. 31 (Sept.
10, 2003) (Coalition Provisional Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government]; Penal Code,
Order No. 7 (June 10, 2003) (Coalition Provisional Authority) [The Interim Iraqi
Government].
100. Tax Strategy of 2004, Order No. 49 (Feb. 19, 2004) (Coalition Provisional
Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government]; Tax Strategy for 2003, Order No. 37 (Sept.
19, 2003) (Coalition Provisional Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government].
101. Banking Law of 2004, Order No. 94 (June 7, 2004) (Coalition Provisional
Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government]; Central Bank Law, Order No. 56 (Mar. 6,
2004) (Coalition Provisional Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government].
102. Traffic Code, Order No. 86 (May 20, 2004) (Coalition Provisional Authority)
[The Interim Iraqi Government].
103. Amendment to the Copyright Law, Order No. 83 (May 1, 2004) (Coalition
Provisional Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government].
104. Financial Management Law and Public Debt Law, Order No. 95 (June 4, 2004)
(Coalition Provisional Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government].
105. Foreign Investment, Order No. 39 (Sept. 23, 2003) (Coalition Provisional
Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government]; see also United Nations & World Bank,
United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, ¶ 2.47 (2003), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTIRAQ/Overview/20147568/Joint%20Need
s%20Assessment.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting new Order
concerning foreign investment “would make the country one of the most open in the
world”).
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of fundamental freedoms and the prevention of rights violations106 and
established an Electoral Commission to oversee national elections during
the transition period before the conclusion of the occupation.107 Further,
the CPA promulgated the Electoral Law, through which it imposed a
system of proportional representation to protect minority groups and
outlined the qualifications necessary to vote in elections for a new
National Assembly from which would be derived the Iraqi Transitional
Government.108 Finally, before it returned the powers of governance to
an Iraqi Interim Government on June 30, 2004, the CPA promulgated
the “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional
Period” through which the CPA entrenched a series of legal provisions
concerning the governance of Iraq during the period from June 30, 2004
until the adoption of a permanent constitution.109
Throughout the CPA’s exercise of these extensive powers of gov-
ernment in Iraq, officials of the CPA maintained that such actions were
designed for the benefit of the Iraqi people.110 To be clear, this Article
does not take a position for or against the desirability of such a trans-
formative enterprise in the context of Iraq or elsewhere. However, before
the occupation, even the United States’ lead coalition partner, the
United Kingdom, expressed some doubt as to the legality of the expan-
sive powers of reform later asserted by U.S. administrators. In March of
2003, U.K. Attorney General Lord Goldsmith wrote to advise Prime
Minister Tony Blair to argue that “a further Security Council resolution is
needed to authorize imposing reform and restructuring of Iraq and its
Government” because the law of belligerent occupation comprising the
Hague and Geneva Conventions would not be a sufficient basis in inter-
national law for such an operation.111 After the United States and United
Kingdom secured the adoption of Resolution 1483, internal U.K. gov-
ernment correspondence confirmed the officially held view that the
mandate in operative paragraph 8 of the resolution for the Secretary-
General’s Special Representative to work “in coordination with the
Authority” to assist the people of Iraq to establish representative govern-
ment and to reform the Iraqi legal and judicial system provided implicit
106. Ministry of Human Rights, Order No. 60 (Feb. 22, 2004) (Coalition Provisional
Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government].
107. The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, Order No. 92 (May 31, 2004)
(Coalition Provisional Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government].
108. The Electoral Law, Order No. 96 (June 15, 2004) (Coalition Provisional
Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government].
109. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (Mar. 8,
2004) (Coalition Provisional Authority) [The Interim Iraqi Government].
110. See, e.g., Coal. Provisional Auth., An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments
2–3 (2004) (listing four directives of CPA: “Security, Essential Services, Economy,
Governance”).
111. Letter from Lord Goldsmith, Att’y Gen., U.K., to Tony Blair, Prime Minister,
U.K. (Mar. 26, 2003), available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/46487/Gold
smith-advice-re-occupying-powers-26March2003.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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support for the activities of the CPA taken in pursuit of these objec-
tives.112 Indeed, Cathy Adams of the Legal Secretariat conveyed the view
of the Attorney General, noting that “the Attorney considers that OP8
does appear to mandate the Coalition to engage in activity going beyond
the scope of an Occupying Power.”113 Further, the Security Council
repeatedly endorsed various measures that the CPA undertook to trans-
form Iraqi legal and political institutions.114
Whether the Security Council’s mandate for, and apparent en-
dorsement of, the United States-led coalition’s transformative measures
in Iraq may be viewed as a precedent authorizing future practice of trans-
formative occupation has been a matter of some controversy in the
scholarship.115 Clearly, though, this Article’s argument that states have
effected a revision of the Hague and Geneva framework through their
subsequent practice cannot rest on one example alone. Therefore, other
instances of regime-change missions are now considered in order to but-
tress this contention.
2. Afghanistan. — In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the United States and various international coalition partners combined
with the forces of the Afghan Northern Alliance to overthrow the de
facto Afghan government (the Taliban).116 The United States regarded
the Al Qaeda network, which had organized the attacks, and the Taliban
as “virtually indistinguishable” and sought to eradicate both.117 Whether
112. Letter from Cathy Adams, Legal Secretariat, Att’y General’s Chambers, to Huw
Llewellyn, Legal Counselor, Foreign & Commonwealth Office ¶ 3 (June 6, 2003), available
at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/43692/document2010-01-27-101000.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
113. Id. ¶ 12.
114. E.g., S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004) (endorsing
timetable for democratic elections laid down by CPA); S.C. Res. 1511, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003) (encouraging “Member States to contribute” to assist stability
and security under Resolution 1483); S.C. Res. 1500, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500 (Aug. 14,
2003) (endorsing CPA’s establishment of Governing Council drawn from cross-section of
Iraqi society as step toward “representative government”).
115. E.g., Benvenisti, supra note 38, at 270 (“There are strong indications that
Resolution 1483 . . . signals an endorsement of a general view that regards modern
occupants as subject to enhanced duties toward the occupied population and therefore
also having the authority to fulfill such duties.”). But see Roberts, Transformative Military
Occupation, supra note 9, at 622 (arguing Resolution 1483 “does not amount to a general
recognition of the validity of transformative policies impacted by occupants”).
116. Throughout the Taliban’s time in power, the international community instead
recognized the de jure government of the Council of Ministers, led by President
Burhanuddin Rabbani, as the legitimate representative of the Afghan people. Rüdiger
Wolfrum & Christiane E. Philipp, The Status of the Taliban: Their Obligations and Rights
Under International Law, 2002 Max Planck Y.B. United Nations L. 559, 575–77.
117. George W. Bush, Address by President George W. Bush (Nov. 10, 2001), in
United States Participation in the United Nations for 2001, at 163, 165 (2003); see also
Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Oct. 7, 2001
from the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001)
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the overthrow of the Taliban constituted a lawful invocation of the right
of self-defense may be questioned,118 but it is clear that the United States-
led military campaign created a political and administrative void that the
international community was eager to ensure was filled appropriately.119
However, the conduct of postwar operations presented a particular
challenge. Afghanistan had been riven by civil war for decades, and its
history of fervent resistance to foreign invasions and weak prewar state
institutions meant that an extensive program to rebuild administrative
capacity would be required and that this program had to appear to be
led by Afghan officials.120 Therefore, on November 13, 2001 (barely a
month after the launch of United States-led combat operations on
October 7, 2001), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, outlined the urgency of reestablishing an
Afghan-led government and of “seeking to legitimize a transition
through a Loya Jirgah” (or representative assembly).121 Further, the
Secretary-General noted, in a report from March 2002 concerning the
work of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),
that the Mission ought to boost Afghan governmental capacity while rely-
ing on “as many Afghan staff as possible . . . [,] thereby leaving a light
expatriate ‘footprint.’”122
(arguing September 11 attack was “made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to
allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by [Al Qaeda] as a base of
operation”).
118. See, e.g., Consequences of Construction, ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 42,
¶ 139 (July 9) (implying inherent right of self-defense embodied in Article 51 of U.N.
Charter only applies when there is armed attack by one state against another). But see
Institut de Droit International, Present Problems of the Use of Armed Force in
International Law: Self-Defence, Res. 10A, ¶ 10 (Oct. 27, 2007) (“In the event of an armed
attack against a State by non-State actors, Article 51 of the Charter as supplemented by
customary international law applies as a matter of principle.”).
119. Then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that “the rapid march of events on
the ground requires that we focus on the challenge we will face in a post-Taliban period.
This means taking urgent action so as to avoid a political and security vacuum.” U.N.
SCOR, 56th Sess., 4414th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4414 (Nov. 13, 2001). This sentiment
was echoed by the Chinese government. Id. at 19 (“We should encourage all parties and
factions in Afghanistan to intensify political dialogue with a view to reaching agreement on
the composition of the transitional administration and avoiding the occurrence of a power
vacuum.”). The concern over a “security vacuum” was also expressed by Bangladesh. Id. at
21 (“There is an urgent need for what [the Secretary-General] called action to avoid a
security vacuum. . . . Ensuring respect for human rights and international humanitarian
law will be critical for sustaining the new political dispensation in Afghanistan.”).
120. See, e.g., Ebrahim Afsah & Alexandra Hilal Guhr, Afghanistan: Building a State
to Keep the Peace, 2005 Max Planck Y.B. United Nations L. 373, 376, 381, 441 (exploring
effect of historical weaknesses of Afghan state on rebuilding efforts).
121. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4414th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4414 (Nov. 13, 2001).
122. U.N. Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for
International Peace and Security, ¶ 98(d), U.N. Doc. A/56/875–S/2002/278 (Mar. 18,
2002).
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In pursuit of this “light footprint” approach, the postconflict project
in Afghanistan differed in certain formal respects from others before or
since. Whereas the Security Council entrusted U.N. missions with full
powers of government for a transitional period in Kosovo and East
Timor, and the United States-led CPA claimed similar powers of govern-
ment in Iraq,123 the de jure right to govern remained in Afghan hands
throughout the period of transition. Indeed, because the international
community had never recognized the de facto rule of the Taliban,124 the
settlement agreement between the various factions of Afghan society
negotiated under the auspices of the U.N. in the fall of 2001 instead
simply provided for the transfer of power from the de jure (though
wholly ineffective) government of President Rabbani and the pre-Taliban
Council of Ministers to an interim authority.125
Despite the formalities of such de facto/de jure distinctions, the
international community has played a key role in the post-Taliban era,
requiring democratization and the guarantee of human rights for its con-
tinued support of the successor regime. From the very outset of its con-
sideration of the overthrow of the Taliban, the Security Council empha-
sized the primacy of human rights in the period of transition and the
necessity of assembling a broadly representative new government.
Security Council Resolution 1378 called on forces operating in
Afghanistan “to adhere strictly to their obligations under human rights
and international humanitarian law,” declared that a transitional admin-
istration ought to be “broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative
of all the Afghan people,” and recommended that such an administra-
tion ought to “respect the human rights of all Afghan people, regardless
of gender, ethnicity or religion.”126 Subsequently, the Bonn Agreement
mandated that “[a]ll actions taken by the Interim Authority shall be con-
sistent with Security Council resolution 1378”127 and pledged to establish
an independent human rights commission responsible for the “investi-
123. See S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (establishing
transitional administration in East Timor); S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(June 10, 1999) (authorizing establishment of transitional administration in Kosovo);
Regulation No. 1 (May 16, 2003) (Coalition Provisional Authority) [The Interim Iraqi
Government] (“The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to
provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional
administration . . . .”).
124. See supra note 116 (noting international community’s recognition of de jure
government of President Rabbani).
125. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Dec. 5, 2001 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001)
[hereinafter Bonn Agreement] (containing Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in
Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions).
126. S.C. Res. 1378, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001).
127. Bonn Agreement, supra note 125, art. V(5).
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gation of violations of human rights, and development of domestic
human rights institutions.”128
The Bonn Agreement laid out the basic path for the reform of
elected bodies and the restoration of representative government in
Afghanistan. An interim authority was to convene an Emergency Loya
Jirga, which would in turn select a transitional authority to administer
Afghanistan until such time as elections could be held and a
Constitutional Loya Jirga would meet to adopt a new constitution.129 The
rewritten Afghan constitution was adopted in January of 2004,130 and the
Bonn process culminated in national elections held to select a National
Assembly on September 18, 2005.131 Though questions have been raised
concerning the extent to which the delegates who negotiated the
Agreement truly represented Afghanistan as a whole,132 it is clear both
from the language of the Agreement and its commendation by the
Security Council thereafter in Resolutions 1383 and 1419 that respect for
human rights and the entrenchment of democratic governance were
recognized as essential requirements for the transition period.133
Further, those international actors tasked with assisting the Afghan
authorities in their efforts to rebuild the country have continually es-
poused the view that commitment to human rights must orient such ef-
forts. Indeed, when the Security Council granted Chapter VII authoriza-
tion for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to take “all
necessary measures” in support of the transitional Afghan government,134
the Security Council also stressed “that all Afghan forces must adhere
strictly to their obligations under human rights law, including respect for
the rights of women, and under international humanitarian law.”135
Moreover, in its redrafting of the Afghan code of criminal procedure
(which resulted in the Interim Criminal Code for Courts adopted by
presidential decree in 2004), the Italian mission in Afghanistan at-
128. Id. art. III(C)(6).
129. Id. art. I.
130. The Afghanistan Compact, at 4, Jan. 31–Feb. 1, 2006, Permanent Rep. of
Afghanistan to the U.N., Annex to the letter dated Feb. 9, 2006 from the Permanent Rep.
of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2006/90 (Feb. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Afghan Compact].
131. E.g., U.N. Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications
for International Peace and Security: Emergency International Assistance for Peace,
Normalcy and Reconstruction of War-Stricken Afghanistan, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/60/712-
S/2006/145 (Mar. 7, 2006) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, Report of Mar. 7, 2006].
132. See, e.g., Stromseth et al., supra note 12, at 119 (“At the outset, the political
process launched with the Bonn agreement was not representative of Afghan society as a
whole.”); Afsah & Guhr, supra note 120, at 375 (describing Bonn Agreement as
“consensus of the elite”).
133. S.C. Res. 1419, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1419 (June 26, 2002); S.C. Res. 1383, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001).
134. S.C. Res. 1386, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001).
135. Id. at 2.
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tempted to ensure that detention and trial procedures comported with
international human rights standards.136 Additionally, the Afghan
Human Rights Commission that the Bonn process established and
UNAMA have been instrumental in vetting candidates for high adminis-
trative office, particularly with regard to reform of the Afghan National
Police, “to exclude human rights violators.”137
Given Afghanistan’s continued financial dependence on the spon-
soring states that have supported its post-Taliban reconstruction, it is also
significant that such states have felt it necessary to tie aid to Afghanistan’s
continued observance of the international human rights standards to
which it committed itself in Article 7 of the postwar Constitution.138 Thus,
in the Afghan Compact of 2006, concluded between the Afghan govern-
ment and fifty participating countries, ten participating organizations,
and fourteen observer states and organizations (referred to collectively in
the Compact as the “international community”139), the parties “reaf-
firm[ed] their commitment to the protection and promotion of rights
provided for in the Afghan constitution and under applicable interna-
tional law,”140 and the Afghan government pledged that its security and
law enforcement agencies would “adopt corrective measures including
codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing arbitrary arrest
and detention, torture, extortion and illegal expropriation of property
with a view to the elimination of these practices.”141 Similarly, in the most
recent round of international monetary pledges (through which states
committed $16 billion to the continued reconstruction efforts), the
donor states explicitly linked the provision of such funds to Afghanistan’s
continued commitment to building a representative government and
respecting international human rights law.142
136. E.g., Matteo Tondini, The Role of Italy in Rebuilding the Judicial System in
Afghanistan, 45 Military L. & L. War Rev. 79, 93–97 (2006).
137. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of Mar. 7, 2006, supra note 131, ¶ 16.
138. Constitution of Afghanistan, Jan. 3, 2004, ch. 1, art. 7 (“The United Nations
Charter, inter-state agreements, . . . and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall
be respected.”).
139. Afghan Compact, supra note 130, at 4.
140. Id. at 6.
141. Id. at 11.
142. See The Tokyo Declaration: Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan from
Transition to Transformation, ¶ 12, Jul. 8, 2012, Permanent Rep. of Afghanistan to the
U.N. & Charges d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations,
Letter dated July 9, 2012 from the Reps. of Afghanistan and Japan to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/867-S/2012/532 (July 12, 2012)
(“The Participants shared the view that the International Community’s ability to sustain
support for Afghanistan depends upon the Afghan Government delivering on its
commitments as part of this renewed partnership.”). In return for aid, the Afghan
government committed to “continue to reflect its pluralistic society and . . . build a stable,
democratic society, based on the rule of law, effective and independent judiciary and good
governance,” as well as “affirm[] that the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its
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Even though Afghanistan presents something of a unique example
because full powers of governance never passed into the hands of an-
other state or international mission, the understanding that the actions
of the successor regime would have to comply with international human
rights standards in order to receive international support is evident.
Moreover, the decisive influence of various international actors through-
out the period of transition ought to be clear from the significant troop
presence and immense financial support. Thus, in Afghanistan, the
international community clearly manifested the view throughout the
transition process that the actions of states and international institutions
involved in rebuilding must promote the establishment of a representa-
tive, rights-friendly regime in Afghanistan in order to receive continued
international support.
3. Kosovo.143 — The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO)
use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on the basis
of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999—and the legality of
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008—have each
been debated rigorously in scholarly fora and elsewhere.144 This Article
will not rehearse the various arguments for and against those two occur-
rences presented by others. Instead, this section discusses the interna-
tional administration of Kosovo, and the promotion of representative
government and respect for human rights during that period, as further
indicia of subsequent practice that evidences an emerging obligation in
the sphere of postconflict territorial administration.
Though countries involved in negotiations to end Serbia’s campaign
of violence against Kosovar Albanians in the lead-up to NATO’s military
intervention purposefully left the territory’s final status ambiguous, they
clearly envisioned some enhanced autonomy for the people of Kosovo as
the preferred outcome. Thus, while the Contact Group representatives
(from Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
and Italy) that led negotiations with the FRY and the Security Council
each affirmed that a final solution must respect the sovereignty and terri-
citizens, in particular the equality of men and women, are guaranteed under the
Constitution and Afghanistan’s international human rights obligations.” Id.
143. This Article considers Kosovo and East Timor as instances of “regime change”
insofar as foreign coercion effected the secession of these territories and placed their
administration in the hands of a different actor in the international system.
144. See generally Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of
Kosovo, 1999 Finnish Y.B. Int’l L. 141, reprinted in Essays on War in International Law 593
(2006) (discussing controversy surrounding NATO involvement in Kosovo and arguing
involvement was justified); W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo’s Antinomies, 93 Am. J. Int’l L.
860 (1999) (arguing exigencies of moment necessitated NATO’s use of force); Bruno
Simma, NATO, the U.N. and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1 (1999)
(discussing legality of NATO’s threat of armed force).
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torial integrity of the FRY, each body also declared that Kosovo ought to
be granted some “meaningful self-administration.”145
Consequently, the Rambouillet Agreement, which the Contact
Group proposed in January of 1999 as an accord to end the conflict
between the FRY and Kosovar Albanians, suggested an entirely new
framework of government for Kosovo. The Agreement proposed a new
constitution for Kosovo, which enshrined democratic government and
respect for human rights, and through which Kosovo would be elevated
to the status of a republic within the FRY with its own elected presi-
dent.146 Its terms proved unacceptable to the Serb delegation and, in
March 1999, NATO initiated a bombing campaign against the FRY in
order to secure a ceasefire and to compel the FRY’s assent to the
Rambouillet Agreement.147 This military campaign finally concluded in
June 1999 when the FRY agreed to withdraw its military and police per-
sonnel from Kosovo and concluded the Military-Technical Agreement
with the NATO-led Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR).148
The Security Council then adopted Resolution 1244, authorizing the
deployment of the KFOR (which later also came to include Russian
troops) to establish a secure environment in the territory and formed the
U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to exercise the
functions of transitional administration until a democratic Kosovar
autonomous authority could be formed.149 The Secretary-General then
appointed a Special Representative as the highest civilian official in
145. S.C. Res. 1160, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); accord Deputy
Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
U.N., Letter dated Mar. 11, 1998 from the Deputy Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of
the Security Council, Annex ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/1998/223 (Mar. 12, 1998) (“We support
neither independence nor the maintenance of the status quo. . . . We support an
enhanced status for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which a substantially
greater degree of autonomy would bring and recognize that this must include meaningful
self-administration.”).
146. Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in
Kosovo, Mar. 18, 1999, Permanent Rep. of France to the U.N., Letter dated June 4, 1999
from the Permanent Rep. of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999); see also Indep. Int’l Comm’n on Kos.,
The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned Annex 3 (2000)
(summarizing Rambouillet Agreement).
147. See, e.g., Indep. Int’l Comm’n on Kos., supra note 146, at 85–86 (recounting
“NATO assumption . . . that a relatively short bombing campaign would persuade
Milosevic to come back to sign the Rambouillet agreement”).
148. Military-Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (KFOR)
and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia,
June 9, 1999, U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated June 15, 1999 from the Secretary-
General addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1999/682
(June 15, 1999).
149. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 123, ¶¶ 5, 7, 10 (authorizing establishment of security
presence to provide interim administration in Kosovo).
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Kosovo, exercising the plenary powers of local government vested in
UNMIK by Resolution 1244.150
Resolution 1244 tasked UNMIK with eleven “main responsibili-
ties.”151 These included “[o]rganizing and overseeing the development of
provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government
pending a political settlement, including . . . elections,” gradually trans-
ferring administrative responsibility to local Kosovar authorities, support-
ing the reconstruction of infrastructure, maintaining law and order, and
“protecting and promoting human rights.”152 UNMIK set about to dis-
charge these “responsibilities” from the very outset of the mission.
UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, similar to initial prescriptions in East Timor,
Iraq, and Afghanistan, preserved the laws applicable in Kosovo before
NATO’s military intervention in March 1999, but mandated that such
laws would continue to be valid only insofar as they did not conflict with
the duties of public officials to “observe internationally recognized
human rights standards” or discriminate against categories of individuals
on impermissible grounds.153 In reaction to local outcry against the
continuation through Regulation 1999/1 of a body of law (existing in
1999) that had progressively decreased the autonomy of Kosovo within
the constitutional structure of the FRY, UNMIK eventually specified that
the applicable law would instead revert to that existing prior to 1989 (the
year in which Slobodan Milosevic revoked the level of autonomy that
Kosovo had previously enjoyed).154 However, even this seeming reversion
expanded the human rights obligations of the interim administration,
specifying a list of international human rights instruments that public
officials had to observe rather than the vaguely formulated “internation-
ally recognized human rights standards” terminology of the earlier regu-
lation.155 Further, in order to ensure compliance with international
150. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, ¶¶ 3, 39, 44, U.N. Doc. S/1999/779 (July 12,
1999) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, Report of July 12, 1999].
151. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 123, ¶ 11.
152. Id.
153. U.N. Mission in Kos., Reg. No. 1999/1, On the Authority of the Interim
Administration in Kosovo, §§ 2–3, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (July 25, 1999); see
also Hansjörg Strohmeyer, Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The U.N. and the
Creation of Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor, Fletcher F. World Aff.,
Summer 2001, at 107, 112 (noting practical difficulty of having to examine existing local
law against international human rights standards).
154. U.N. Mission in Kos., Reg. No. 1999/24, On the Law Applicable in Kosovo,
§ 1.1(b), U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/24 (Dec. 12, 1999) [hereinafter UNMIK, Reg.
No. 1999/24]; see also Stromseth et al., supra note 12, at 316–18 (discussing historical
context of Regulation 1999/24).
155. UNMIK, Reg. No. 1999/24, supra note 154, § 1.3. The Regulation required that
public officials observe “internationally recognized human rights standards, as reflected
in” a number of specified human rights treaties: the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International
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human rights standards and the creation of democratic institutions, in
just the first year of its administration UNMIK invalidated as discrimina-
tory certain property laws that had been adopted under the FRY
regime;156 criminalized “publicly incit[ing] or publicly spread[ing]
hatred, discord or intolerance between national, racial, religious, ethnic
or other such groups living in Kosovo;”157 provided for the establishment
of an ombudsperson to investigate human rights violations and promote
ethnic reconciliation;158 supervised elections to municipal assemblies
whose meetings were to be held in both Albanian and Serbian;159 and
established an Administrative Department for Democratic Governance
and Civil Society to ensure respect for human rights and democratic pro-
cesses in the work of “other Administrative Departments, local admin-
istration, and any emerging self-governing structures.”160 Thus, even
though the structure and governance practices of UNMIK itself have
been criticized as undemocratic and, in some instances, responsible for
the perpetration of human rights violations,161 its efforts to ensure repre-
sentative governance and the establishment of local institutions that
respect human rights should be clear.
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the International Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Id.
156. U.N. Mission in Kos., Reg. No. 1999/10, On the Repeal of Discriminatory
Legislation Affecting Housing and Rights in Property, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/10
(Oct. 13, 1999) (repealing two property laws as “discriminatory in nature” and “contrary to
international human rights standards”).
157. U.N. Mission in Kos., Reg. No. 2000/4, On the Prohibition Against Inciting to
National, Racial, Religious or Ethnic Hatred, Discord or Intolerance, § 1.1, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/2000/4 (Feb. 1, 2000).
158. U.N. Mission in Kos., Reg. No. 2000/38, On the Establishment of the
Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/38 (June 30, 2000).
159. U.N. Mission in Kos., Reg. No. 2000/45, On Self-Government of Municipalities
in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/45 (Aug. 11, 2000) (“Meetings of the Municipal
Assembly and its committees and public meetings shall be conducted in both the Albanian
and Serbian languages.”); U.N. Mission in Kos., Reg. No. 2000/39, On the Municipal
Elections in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/39 (July 8, 2000) (establishing
municipal election process).
160. U.N. Mission in Kos., Reg. No. 2000/40, On the Establishment of the
Administrative Department for Democratic Governance and Civil Society, § 2.2(b), U.N.
Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/40 (July 10, 2000).
161. See, e.g., Ombudsperson Inst. in Kos., Special Rep. No. 4, ¶ 24 (2001), available
at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/docs/E4010912a_633702.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (criticizing UNMIK detention procedures as incompatible
with European Convention on Human Rights); Ombudsperson Inst. in Kos., Special Rep.
No. 1, ¶¶ 23–24 (2000), available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/
docs/E4010426a_86354.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (deploring UNMIK’s
grant of immunity to itself and its personnel as contrary to rule of law and asserting it
“paves the way for the impunity of the state”).
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Indeed, in addition to these initial actions, in 2001 UNMIK promul-
gated the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo, which prepared the path
for the territory’s self-government within a representative, democratic
structure.162 The Framework established the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government (an assembly, president, government, courts, and vari-
ous other bodies listed in the Framework) and mandate that they observe
the individual human rights guarantees set forth in a number of interna-
tional agreements (an expanded list of instruments from that set out in
UNMIK Regulation 1999/24).163
Further, the Constitutional Framework evidences the necessity of
balancing the majoritarianism of elections as the procedure for compos-
ing democratic institutions with the necessity of ensuring that the rights
of minority communities will be respected. As such, the Framework set
forth that the Assembly would be selected through secret ballot based on
universal adult suffrage, but reserved twenty of the 120 seats in the
Assembly for representatives of “non-Albanian Kosovo Communities.”164
Similarly, the presidency would consist of seven members of the
Assembly, with two from the party having received the highest number of
votes, two from the party with the second highest, one from the party
with the third highest, one from the Kosovo Serb Community, and the
remaining member from the “non-Kosovo Albanian and non-Kosovo
Serb Community.”165 Indeed, this principle of distributive representation
to ensure a voice to minority communities is remarkably similar to that
undertaken in other postconflict transitions detailed in this Article.166
Perhaps most crucially for this analysis, in 2003, the Security Council
endorsed “Standards for Kosovo,” a short document containing eight
areas of optimal government performance that the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo were required to attain before
the territory’s final status could be settled.167 These categories for im-
provement included functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law,
and the rights of communities, with many specific goals articulated
162. U.N. Mission in Kos., Reg. No. 2001/9, On a Constitutional Framework for
Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001).
163. Id. chs. 1–3. In addition to those agreements listed in supra note 155, the
Framework also recognized the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protections of National
Minorities. Id. ch. 3.
164. Id. ch. 9.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 108 (discussing similar system imposed
by CPA in Iraq).
167. U.N. Mission in Kos., Standards for Kosovo (2003) [hereinafter UNMIK,
Standards for Kosovo], available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%
7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20Standards.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review); see also S.C. Pres. Statement 2003/26, U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/2003/26 (Dec. 12, 2003) (“‘The Security Council supports the “Standards for
Kosovo” presented on 10 December 2003.’”).
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within each category.168 The pursuit of these goals came to be known as a
policy of “standards before status” through which the international
community conditioned negotiations on Kosovo’s final status (whether as
an autonomous entity within Yugoslavia or otherwise) on the extent to
which Kosovo’s domestic institutions complied with international stand-
ards of human rights and democracy.169 The Security Council made clear
that a comprehensive review would evaluate the performance of Kosovo’s
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government against the Standards and
that “further advancement towards a process to determine future status
[sic] of Kosovo in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999) will depend
on the positive outcome of this comprehensive review.”170 This review was
undertaken in 2005, and the Security Council decided that sufficient
progress had been made to initiate negotiations over the territory’s final
status.171 Before talks could be concluded, Kosovo unilaterally declared
its independence. However, a significant international presence remains
(with many government support functions transferred from UNMIK to a
deployment of the European Union, EULEX).172
Kosovo, therefore, provides an important illustration of the respon-
sibility for proper administration that international actors have adopted
in the practice of international territorial administration. Indeed, the
Security Council not only mandated the promotion of human rights and
the establishment of democratic institutions as “main responsibilities” of
the international civil presence,173 but also required that Kosovar institu-
tions of local government be deemed to have fulfilled such requirements
in their administrative practice before allowing negotiations over auton-
omy to proceed.
4. East Timor. — The status of East Timor had been a matter of
international dispute since the invasion and occupation of the
168. UNMIK, Standards for Kosovo, supra note 167. The other categories were
freedom of movement, the economy, property rights, dialogue (with Belgrade), and the
Kosovo Protection Corps. Id.
169. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Implementing ‘Standards Before
Status’ Policy Core Political Project for UN Kosovo Mission, Security Council Told, U.N.
Press Release SC/7999 (Feb. 6, 2004) (recounting U.K. representative’s position that
Standards embodied “only way forward towards final status”).
170. S.C. Pres. Statement 2003/26, supra note 167 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
171. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/2006/45 (Jan. 25, 2006)
(noting Security Council decided after review “to launch a political process designed to
determine Kosovo’s future status”).
172. E.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. S/2008/692 (Nov. 24,
2008) (describing international presence and transfer of policing and other
responsibilities from UNMIK to EULEX).
173. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text (discussing eleven
responsibilities outlined in Resolution 1244).
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Portuguese colony by Indonesia in 1975.174 In May of 1999, Portugal and
Indonesia concluded an agreement with the United Nations to allow the
people of East Timor to decide through referendum whether to remain
part of Indonesia or become independent.175 The United Nations already
had an established civilian mission in East Timor and the Secretary-
General anticipated that a vote against remaining part of Indonesia
would necessitate a period of U.N. administration of East Timor to
supervise the territory’s transition to full independence.176 However,
when a large majority of East Timorese actually voted to sever ties with
Indonesia, pro-Indonesian militias unleashed a wave of violence against
civilians and international personnel that attracted widespread condem-
nation.177 Under growing international pressure, the Indonesian govern-
ment consented to the deployment of an international peacekeeping
force in East Timor to restore order.178
In response, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a
peacekeeping force as a binding enforcement action under Chapter VII
despite Indonesia’s consent179 and then established the U.N. Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), also under Chapter VII, “to
exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administra-
tion of justice.”180 The Security Council empowered a Transitional
Administrator of East Timor (to be appointed by the Secretary-General
as his Special Representative) “to enact new laws and regulations and to
amend, suspend or repeal existing ones.”181 The Security Council also
urged the new mission to develop democratic institutions and an inde-
pendent East Timorese human rights body so as to ensure adequate con-
sultation with the local population.182 As such, plenary legislative and
administrative power was entrusted to a U.N. administrator who was
tasked by the Security Council with reform of the East Timorese legal
174. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶¶ 13–15 (June 30).
175. U.N. Secretary-General, Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-
General, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/53/951-S/1999/513 (May 5, 1999) (containing Agreement
Between Republic of Indonesia and Portuguese Republic on Question of East Timor).
176. See id. ¶ 7 (allowing voluntary contributions from nations so U.N. presence in
East Timor may be established quickly in anticipation of being needed after election).
177. E.g., U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4043d mtg. at 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4043 (Sept. 11,
1999); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East
Timor, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1024 (Oct. 4, 1999).
178. See, e.g., Fox, Humanitarian Occupation, supra note 9, at 101 (describing
circumstances surrounding Indonesia’s grant of consent); Tansey, supra note 12, at 65
(same).
179. S.C. Res. 1264, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999).
180. S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 123, ¶ 1.
181. Id. ¶ 6.
182. Id. ¶ 8.
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and administrative system and its turn toward democratic independ-
ence.183
In fulfillment of these purposes, UNTAET promulgated Regulation
1999/1, which mandated that public officials be bound by a host of in-
ternational human rights treaties and that Indonesian law be retained to
the extent compatible with these treaties until amended by the
Transitional Administrator or future democratic institutions of East
Timor.184 The Administration’s first regulation identified six laws that it
deemed prima facie incompatible with the human rights instruments
listed and which it therefore declared invalid.185 The Administration’s
second regulation attempted to give a credible veneer of local participa-
tion to the U.N. regime through the establishment of a National
Consultative Council broadly reflective of East Timorese society and the
results of the independence referendum (insofar as the majority of
Timorese seats on the Consultative Council were to be drawn from rep-
resentatives of the pro-independence National Council of East Timorese
Resistance).186 The Consultative Council could advise the Transitional
Administrator and “make policy recommendations on significant execu-
tive and legislative matters,” but the Transitional Administrator remained
the ultimate decisionmaker within the territory.187 Indeed, Consultative
Council Members had to swear an oath to uphold democratic institu-
tions, human rights and nonviolent political expression, and the
Transitional Administrator could remove any member for an apparent
violation of the principles of that oath.188 Accordingly, both international
and local actors pledged from the very beginning of the Transitional
Administration to ensure the promotion of human rights and the estab-
lishment of democracy in the regime-building project in East Timor,
even though such processes were to be carried out under the ultimate
authority of an international official.
The international mission in East Timor may therefore be described
as an attempt to balance the authoritativeness thought necessary for in-
ternational officials to build new, human rights-based institutions with
respect for the right to self-determination of the local population.
International officials pursued the latter objective through the gradual
183. U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Reg. No. 1999/1, On the Authority of
the Transitional Administration in East Timor, § 1.1, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/1999/1
(Nov. 27, 1999) (“All legislative and executive authority with respect to East Timor,
including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNTAET and is exercised by the
Transitional Administrator.”).
184. Id. §§ 2–3.
185. Id. § 3.
186. U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Reg. No. 1999/2, On the
Establishment of a National Consultative Council, §§ 1–2, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/
1999/2 (Dec. 2, 1999).
187. Id. § 3.
188. Id. §§ 6–7.
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integration of local representatives into the processes of government
until full independence was achieved. UNTAET, like UNMIK in Kosovo,
has been criticized for its autocratic style of governance,189 but it did
gradually increase the involvement of East Timorese representatives in
the governing process. In July 2000, approximately nine months after the
establishment of the interim U.N. administration, Regulation 2000/23
created a cabinet, which came to be divided evenly between East
Timorese and international officials, to formulate policies for the
Administration, supervise various departments, and make regulatory rec-
ommendations to the Transitional Administrator.190 Regulation 2000/24,
promulgated on the same day, then replaced the National Consultative
Council with an enlarged National Council appointed by the Transitional
Administrator to serve as “a forum for all legislative matters” through the
initiation or modification of draft regulations.191 The next year,
Regulation 2001/2 replaced the National Council with an elected
Constituent Assembly tasked with writing a new constitution,192 and
Regulation 2001/28 replaced the Cabinet with a Council of Ministers
composed wholly of Timorese officials.193 Finally, East Timor declared
independence on May 20, 2002, completing the transition process from
colony to occupied territory to independent state.194
While democratic institution-building was a paramount concern to
international administrators throughout the transition period, it should
also be noted that UNTAET sought to transcend the simple majoritarian
domination associated with some democratic systems of governance. The
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), the
leading Timorese group in the resistance to Indonesian occupation,
stood almost certain to win large majorities in elections because of its
189. See, e.g., Jarat Chopra, The U.N.’s Kingdom of East Timor, Survival, Autumn
2000, at 27, 30–33 (criticizing authoritarian style of governance and discussing deleterious
impact on East Timorese population).
190. U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Reg. No. 2000/23, On the
Establishment of the Cabinet of the Transitional Government in East Timor, §§ 1–2, 4,
U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/23 (July 14, 2000).
191. U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Reg. No. 2000/24, On the
Establishment of a National Council, § 1, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/24 (July 14,
2000); see also Wilde, Territorial Administration, supra note 53, at 2 n.2 (noting
regulation followed calls for greater participation by local government).
192. U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Reg. No. 2001/2, On the Election of a
Constituent Assembly to Prepare a Constitution for an Independent and Democratic East
Timor, § 1.1, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/2 (Mar. 16, 2001).
193. U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Reg. No. 2001/28, On the
Establishment of the Council of Ministers, § 1, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/28 (Sept.
19, 2001).
194. See Press Release, Security Council, Council Endorses Proposal to Declare East
Timor’s Independence 20 May 2002, U.N. Press Release SC/7192 (Oct. 31, 2001) (noting
Security Council recommendation of East Timorese independence); cf. S.C. Res. 1414,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1414 (May 23, 2002) (recommending admission of East Timor as
member of United Nations).
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widespread recognition among the Timorese population.195 Yet,
UNTAET sought to establish a system of proportional representation that
would ensure that FRETILIN’s huge popularity did not translate into the
ability to amend the agreed-upon constitution at will or crush smaller
opposition factions.196 Thus, balance in the approach—between the
desire for majoritarian democracy and the enforcement of international
will to ensure that the institutions left behind would last in a broadly rep-
resentative fashion—was a hallmark of the U.N. Transitional
Administration in East Timor.
5. Libya. — NATO’s military intervention in Libya, first to protect
civilian populations in Eastern Libya and then to assist in the ouster of
the Gaddafi regime, may not at first appear to fit easily within the frame-
work of responsibilities incumbent upon regime changers that this
Article has set about to define. Indeed, Security Council Resolution 1973,
as a concession to those members of the Security Council haunted by the
ghosts of Iraq and consequently fearful (perhaps justifiably so) that the
authorization to protect civilians might creep into a full scale regime-
change operation, explicitly “exclud[ed] a foreign occupation force of
any form on any part of Libyan territory.”197 As such, it may well be
thought that such a pronouncement freed those states intervening mili-
tarily from any obligation toward the people of Libya or toward the re-
structuring of a stable, democratic, human rights-friendly regime.
Yet, contemporaneous statements issued by international leaders
concerning the military intervention would seem to indicate a different
understanding. Thus, addressing the General Assembly in 2011,
President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy made clear not
only that, through NATO’s intervention in Libya, “[t]he principle of ‘re-
sponsibility to protect’ was put into action [] with perseverance and suc-
cess,” but also that “[n]ow there is a responsibility to assist the new Libya
with the political transition, reconciliation and reconstruction of a united
country.”198 Echoing these comments, Spain’s Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation, Trinidad Jiménez, declared “We now have an
obligation to continue to help the Libyan people in the reconciliation
and reconstruction processes,”199 and Belgium’s Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Steven Vanackere, affirmed that “the
international community has a responsibility to help in the reconstruc-
195. See, e.g., Tansey, supra note 12, at 87 (“[I]t was widely, and correctly, believed
that most of the district representatives would ultimately be from Fretilin.”).
196. See, e.g., id. at 86 (arguing UNTAET’s push for proportional representation
“reflected a desire . . . to make sure that Fretilin’s already strong position was not
exaggerated by a majoritarian system”).
197. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
198. U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., 15th plen. mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. A/66/PV.15 (Sept. 22,
2011).
199. U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., 24th plen. mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. A/66/PV.24 (Sept. 24,
2011).
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tion of Libya” and referred to that responsibility as “an integral part of
the responsibility to protect.”200
Furthermore, even though no provision was made for plenary ad-
ministration of the sort authorized in Kosovo or East Timor, or for any
foreign occupation force of the sort sanctioned in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the Security Council still manifested this responsibility to assist in Libya’s
postconflict transition through the establishment of the U.N. Support
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).201 The Security Council created UNSMIL
through a binding Chapter VII resolution, which obviated the necessity
of the new Libyan regime’s consent for the duration of the mandate.
Resolution 2009 instructed UNSMIL to “assist and support” Libyan au-
thorities to restore public safety, initiate a “constitution-making and elec-
toral process,” “promote and protect human rights,” and “extend state
authority” by “strengthening emerging accountable institutions.”202
Extending UNSMIL’s mandate for a further twelve months in March
2012,203 again in March 2013,204 and against in March 2014,205 all three
times under Chapter VII, the Security Council called upon Libyan
authorities “to take all steps necessary to prevent violations of human
rights” and affirmed the mission of UNSMIL to assist in the democratic
transition, attainment of public security and promotion of human rights
in Libya.206
Despite this demonstration of accumulated practice, in order to sub-
stantiate the Article’s argument that a revised obligation has emerged, it
must be shown that this practice has also established the agreement of
the parties to this revised interpretation of the Hague and Geneva
regime. It is to this task that the Article now turns.
C. Establishing the Agreement of the Parties
When the General Assembly endorsed a modified version of the
“Responsibility to Protect” doctrine in 2005, it did not explicitly mention
the “Responsibility to Rebuild” component of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s (ICISS) formula-
tion.207 Yet, states have increasingly recognized an obligation to assist in
postconflict reconstruction and stabilization. For example, the comments
of the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, in his 2002
200. Id. at 5.
201. S.C. Res. 2009, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2009 (Sept. 16, 2011).
202. Id.
203. S.C. Res. 2040, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2040 (Mar. 12, 2012).
204. S.C. Res. 2095, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2095 (Mar. 14, 2013).
205. S.C. Res. 2144, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2144 (Mar. 13, 2014).
206. S.C. Res. 2040, supra note 203, ¶ 4.
207. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 46, ¶¶ 138–139 (mentioning only
responsibility to protect “from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity”).
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address to the General Assembly concerning Afghanistan—wherein he
affirmed that “[w]e must now rebuild[,] we must help the Afghan peo-
ple, maintain our efforts over the long term, and continue our work to
bring about stability and democracy”208—have been echoed by multiple
other state representatives who each have drawn attention to their state’s
own efforts to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the obliga-
tion of members of the international community to lend support to such
efforts. China, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Iran,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, the
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania,
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Uzbekistan have made state-
ments in which they have endorsed international reconstruction efforts,
highlighted their own contribution in that regard, and/or, in several
cases, appeared explicitly to affirm the obligatory nature of such com-
mitments to rebuilding and representative transitional administration.209
Similarly, even though many states opposed the United States-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the statement of the President of Latvia to the
General Assembly seems to have been indicative of the general under-
standing that the international community must lend its support to the
transitional administration. The President of Latvia noted, with regard to
both Afghanistan and Iraq, that “the military measures undertaken by
the United States and its allies will have to be followed by comprehensive
international efforts to help those countries rebuild their societies and
their economies,” and that “most of us would agree on the need for
reconstruction and security regardless of our opinion about the foreign
military presence in these two countries.”210 Indeed, the President of
Brazil, urging the United Nations to take a leading role in supervising
the reestablishment of security and the postwar Iraqi political process,
declared that “[w]e must not shy away from our collective responsibili-
ties.”211 Moreover, leaders from Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Croatia,
Dominica, East Timor, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Honduras,
Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Macedonia, Malaysia,
Mauritius, Morocco, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
the Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Spain, Slovenia, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and
Vietnam have each pledged their support for and, in some cases, their
active contribution to, rebuilding operations and transitional efforts to
208. U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 3d plen. mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. A/57/PV.3 (Sept. 12,
2002).
209. See infra Appendix 1 (listing relevant General Assembly statements of U.N.
member states).
210. U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 8th plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.8 (Sept. 23,
2003).
211. U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.7 (Sept. 23,
2003).
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ensure representative political institutions.212 While states have expressed
concern over and disagreed about the proper actor to discharge this re-
sponsibility to rebuild, with several noting that the United Nations and
not national occupation forces ought to have been in charge of such
postconflict operations, those states that have made public statements on
questions of reconstruction and transitional administration have never-
theless expressed the position that such functions ought to be
undertaken.
The foregoing examination of recent practice and the acquiescence
of states has shown that time and again states and international organiza-
tions entrusted to administer territory in post-regime-change settings
have acted not only to ensure the security of the local population and the
reconstruction of infrastructure damaged in the conflict, but also to
establish representative local government, protect human rights, and
safeguard the interests of minority communities. Further, states and
international organizations carrying out such functions have also taken
on the responsibility of doing what they can to facilitate the installation
of a successor regime that would be democratic, respect basic rights, and
abjure the persecution of minority groups. States and international
organizations have discharged these tasks at the insistence of other
states—the statements of bystander states in support of the missions
described indicate a general agreement to the revision of the minimalist
Hague and Geneva framework. This finding raises several other ques-
tions of international law, however, which must be addressed before a
final conclusion may be reached.
IV. RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL
If it is accepted first that states conducting regime-change operations
now have certain postconflict obligations toward the population of the
host state and, second, that states or the international organizations that
take charge of international transitional administration projects may bear
responsibility for the subsequent bad acts of a successor regime whose
installation they facilitated or failed reasonably to prevent, some consid-
eration must be given to whether general international law supports the
imposition of such responsibility and what legal limits may apply. This
Part therefore examines the extent to which the imposition of responsi-
bility for the acts of another finds support in international law and dis-
cusses varying doctrines of attribution based on the level of control exer-
cised by the accused actor that may constrain the responsibility of states
or international organizations for the consequences of those acts or
omissions.
212. See infra Appendix 2 (listing U.N. statements of parties regarding Iraq).
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A. Responsibility for the Conduct of Another State
A state must not contribute to the unlawful acts of another state.213
The ICJ made clear in the advisory opinion concerning South Africa’s
unlawful occupation of Namibia that states have a duty not to recognize
or contribute to illegal situations in international law.214 Moreover, the
ILC has confirmed that complicity in the illegal acts of another state may
engage the international responsibility of the complicit state.215 Given the
prominent involvement of international organizations in missions of ter-
ritorial administration and reform, it is important to note that the ILC
has also identified complicity as a basis upon which to engage the inter-
national responsibility of an international organization.216 Further, in its
study of customary international humanitarian law, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has asserted as a “rule” that “[a]
State is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law at-
tributable to it, including . . . violations committed by persons or entities
it empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority.”217 As
such, the basic position is that with regard to an internationally wrongful
act committed by another, a state or international organization that
assists knowingly (in the ILC’s formulation) or simply contributes
through empowering the entity that commits the violation to exercise
elements of government authority (the ICRC’s position) may be held
responsible.
213. See, e.g., Helmut Philipp Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility
191 (2011) [hereinafter Aust, Complicity and Responsibility] (finding “general rule on
complicity has entered the corpus of customary international law”); Lea Brilmayer & Isaias
Yemane Tesfalidet, Third State Obligations and the Enforcement of International Law, 44
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1, 5 (2011) (arguing states “are under a legal obligation not to
contribute to another State’s violation of international law”); Helmut Philipp Aust,
Complicity in Violations of International Humanitarian Law 22 (Dec. 20, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136885 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (“It is today firmly accepted that aiding or assisting another state
in the commission of internationally wrongful acts entails the responsibility of the helping
state/international organisation if certain conditions are met.”).
214. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 119 (June 21).
215. ARSIWA, supra note 21, art. 16 (holding states responsible for aiding and
assisting wrongful acts of another state); see also Vaughan Lowe, Responsibility for the
Conduct of Other States, 101 Kokusaiho Gaiko Zassi [J. of Int’l L. & Dipl.] 1, 3–8 (2002)
(Japan) (discussing “responsibility of one State for the unlawful conduct of another
State”).
216. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, Rep. of the
Int’l Law Comm’n, 63d Sess., Apr. 26–June 3, July 4–Aug. 12, 2001, art. 14, at 54, U.N.
Doc. A/66/10 [hereinafter DARIO]; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2011) (holding
international organizations responsible for aiding and assisting wrongful acts of another
state or international organization).
217. 1 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross,
Customary International Humanitarian Law, r. 149, at 530 (2009).
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Whether responsibility for acts of another ought somehow to
depend on the nature of the wrongful act or the relationship between
the international bystander and the injured or injurer is not yet settled
law. Indeed, though the ICJ declined to decide the merits of East Timor
(Portugal v. Australia) on the basis that an indispensable third party
(Indonesia) was not present,218 Judge Weeramantry made clear in his dis-
senting opinion that the erga omnes nature of the right in question (the
right of the people of East Timor to self-determination) must give rise to
a corresponding erga omnes duty to respect that right on the part of all
states.219 As such, the international responsibility of Australia could be
engaged because Australia’s conclusion of a treaty with Indonesia (pur-
porting to act on behalf of East Timor) constituted recognition of
Indonesia’s unlawful occupation of East Timor in violation of the
Timorese people’s right to self-determination.220 Further, Judge
Weeramantry asserted that, as the de jure administering power of East
Timor by virtue of trusteeship arrangements concluded before the
Indonesian invasion, Portugal had a special duty to vindicate its rights as
trustee of the people of East Timor and that “Portugal would be in viola-
tion of that basic obligation if, while being the administering Power, and
while claiming to be such, it has failed to take such action as was available
to it in law for protecting the rights of the people of East Timor.”221 As
such, the combination of the erga omnes quality of the right in question
and the special position of Portugal as the administering power required
that Portugal take action against violations of such rights perpetrated by
Australia. Had Portugal not done all it could to prevent such violations,
the international responsibility of Portugal itself could be engaged.
Similarly, in the context of the present inquiry, it may be argued that
the intervening state has, by virtue of its military intervention, placed
itself in a special position in relation to the host state, which has in turn
placed upon the intervening state a special obligation to ensure that the
successor regime in the territory in which it intervened respects the fun-
damental rights of the inhabitants. Where the successor regime violates
such rights and the intervening state has not done as much as it lawfully
should to prevent such violations, the responsibility of the intervening
state may be engaged. While the ICJ declined to decide the question of
whether certain states are put in a special position of enforcement in
relation to obligations erga omnes, as advanced in Belgium’s pleadings in
the Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v.
Senegal),222 the Court’s recognition in the case of the prohibition of tor-
ture as a norm of jus cogens, and its earlier specification that a state’s
218. 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30).
219. Id. at 209 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 221–22.
221. Id. at 217.
222. Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 422, ¶¶ 66, 70 (July 20).
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capacity to influence may determine the content of its obligation to pre-
vent under the Genocide Convention, may indicate some enhanced duty
on states positioned to prevent or curtail the violation of such rights.223
In this regard, the Kosovo Human Rights Advisory Panel’s recent
decision in the case of S.C. v. UNMIK may be instructive.224 There, the
complainant alleged that her husband and son were abducted and killed
by soldiers of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and that UNMIK’s fail-
ure to investigate these forced disappearances and murders constituted a
violation of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (a
human rights instrument with which UNMIK had itself bound all of its
officials to comply).225 While the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (the respondent in the case) acknowledged that, by virtue of
Security Council Resolution 1244, “UNMIK was responsible for the secu-
rity and safety of persons living in Kosovo,” he alleged that the special
circumstances of the delayed deployment of security personnel consti-
tuted special circumstances that might excuse responsibility.226 The
Panel, however, affirmed that UNMIK’s unique position did not diminish
the necessity of respecting human rights and that UNMIK had failed to
carry out basic investigative actions as required under the procedural
component of Article 2 of the Convention.227 As such, even though the
violation concerned the failure of UNMIK itself to act, the decision is
also important for establishing responsibility for the actions of another
actor because the violation at the root of the claim concerned UNMIK’s
failure to protect the complainant’s relatives from the actions of a third
party (the KLA) when UNMIK had overall responsibility for ensuring
security.
Finally, the recently finalized Arms Trade Treaty may indicate the
increasing acknowledgment of states concerning their obligation to avoid
complicity in internationally wrongful acts.228 While the United States,
United Kingdom, and France jointly declared their intention in 1950 to
export arms only to states that had committed not to initiate any act of
aggression,229 the new Arms Trade Treaty broadens this sort of commit-
ment. The treaty requires that states, before exporting arms, undertake
223. Id. ¶¶ 66, 99.
224. S.C. v. UNMIK, Human Rights Advisory Panel, Case No. 02/09 (Dec. 6, 2012);
see also U.N. Mission in Kos., Reg. No. 2006/12, On the Establishment of the Human
Rights Advisory Panel, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2006/12 (Mar. 23, 2006) (setting out
purpose and procedure of Human Rights Advisory Panel).
225. S.C. v. UNMIK, ¶¶ 22–28, 48.
226. Id. ¶¶ 63–66.
227. Id. ¶¶ 77, 88, 97–102.
228. Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, Mar. 18–28, 2013,
Draft Decision, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.217/2013/L.3 (Mar. 27, 2013) [hereinafter
Arms Trade Treaty].
229. Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East, 22 Dep’t St. Bull.
886, 886 (1950), quoted in Aust, Complicity and Responsibility, supra note 213, at 130.
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an assessment of whether such arms “could be used to commit or facili-
tate a serious violation of international humanitarian law” or “to commit
or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law.”230 And
the treaty requires that states also apply these criteria with regard to the
export of arms to nonparties to the treaty.231 Thus, while it does not en-
tirely ban the sale of arms, the draft treaty makes clear that states are to
undertake a responsible assessment of their contribution to abuses and
avoid these wherever possible. The second part of the obligation con-
cerning the installation of a successor regime proposed in this Article
might operate in a similar fashion. States or international organizations
administering territory would be expected to undertake an assessment as
to the likelihood that the administration whose rise they facilitated might
perpetrate significant abuses of human rights before withdrawing the
mission or lending further military aid thereafter. This responsibility is
thus a manifestation of the obligation to ensure and the obligation of
due diligence already outlined.232
B. Control
One of the most pressing questions implicated in the identification
and apportionment of responsibility on the part of states and interna-
tional organizations in post-regime-change situations is that of control.
Contemporary military operations of this sort are often multilateral exer-
cises through which a coalition of states (as was the case with the United
States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003) or an international organization (as
occurred with NATO in Kosovo) initiates military action (sometimes in
conjunction with local rebel forces, as was the case in Afghanistan and
Libya).233 Further, arrangements for the administration of the territory or
state in question may well encompass some distribution of responsibili-
ties between various states and international institutions. Thus, for ex-
ample, following the capitulation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,
the United States took lead responsibility for the reform of the Afghan
National Army, Germany for the Afghan police, the United Kingdom for
anti-drug trafficking operations, Italy for the reform of the Afghan justice
system, and Japan for disarmament of local paramilitaries and the reinte-
230. Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 228, art. 7(1)(b)(i)–(ii).
231. Id. art. 23.
232. See, e.g., supra Part II.B (detailing obligation to ensure or prevent); supra notes
15–17 and accompanying text (outlining due diligence responsibility of states).
233. On the point of the multilateralism of military occupation, see generally Grant
T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 1 (2006). Concerning
the role of Polish troops in Iraq, see Agnieszka Jachec-Neale, International Humanitarian
Law and Polish Involvement in Stabilizing Iraq, in Testing the Boundaries of International
Humanitarian Law 221, 232–34 (Susan C. Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006),
which argues Polish troops, though not formally in occupation of Iraq in same way as U.S.
and U.K. troops, must by virtue of Security Council Resolution 1438’s address to “all
concerned” still respect the law of occupation as articulated in the Hague Regulations and
Fourth Geneva Convention.
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gration into civil society of ex-combatants.234 Similarly, in Kosovo, while
UNMIK, by virtue of Security Council Resolution 1244, retained overall
control of the administration of the territory, it delegated various func-
tions to other international actors.235 Consequently, the Kosovo Mission
was divided into four pillars, with the United Nations itself responsible
for civil administration, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees for
humanitarian affairs, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe for institution-building, and the European Union for reconstruc-
tion.236
This phenomenon of dividing functions poses several challenges to
an attempt to assign responsibility. The obligation laid out in this Article
encompasses two parts. The first part concerns the responsibility of the
intervening international actor for actions directly attributable to those
acting under its control. The second concerns the indirect liability of
international actors for actions in violation of human rights undertaken
by the successor regime installed by such international actors based on
theories of complicity and obligations erga omnes. The division of func-
tions in transitional administration poses more of a challenge to the se-
cond part of this responsibility than to the first. Indeed, where a state or
international organization is tasked with the function directly analogous
to a component of responsibility (for example, where an actor must
ensure security, which itself is a component of the overall responsibility
laid out in this Article) then the attribution of responsibility is somewhat
more clear. As such, in Afghanistan, it is ISAF (the multinational force
authorized by the Security Council to provide security in Afghanistan)
and not UNAMA (the United Nations’s civilian administrative support
mission) that pays claims for compensation resulting from damage
inflicted during security operations.237 Even in this first category, though,
234. Cf. De Brabandere, Post-Conflict Administrations, supra note 9, at 44 (“The
reconstruction efforts were based on a ‘lead-nation approach’, leaving the responsibility
for certain areas to a specific country . . . .”).
235. See, e.g., Fox, Humanitarian Occupation, supra note 9, at 93 (discussing how
various “components” of UNMIK were each “controlled by a different international
entity”).
236. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of July 12, 1999, supra note 150, ¶ 43.
237. Press Release, ISAF Joint Command-Afg., Kandahar Governor Says Loss Reports
Are Far from Reality (Jan. 14 2011), http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/
kandahar-governor-says-loss-reports-are-far-from-reality.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (quoting Major General James Terry, Commander of ISAF’s Regional Command
South, saying, “[i]f we damage something, it is our obligation and responsibility to
compensate for it”). For specific instances in which ISAF has paid compensation for
injuries caused by joint Afghan-international forces action, see Press Release, ISAF Joint
Command-Afg., Individual Killed in Operation in Wardak Province (Mar. 21, 2010),
http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/individual-killed-in-operation-in-wardak-prov
ince.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review), and Press Release, ISAF Joint Command-
Afg., Three Civilians Accidentally Killed During Operation Moshtarak (Feb. 16, 2010),
http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/three-civilians-accidentally-killed-during-ope
ration-moshtarak.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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norms of agency and delegation may challenge such an account. Even if
the actor is tasked with some clearly distinguishable function, its role as
subordinate to another may complicate attribution. For example, in
Kosovo, UNMIK retained ultimate authority, and in turn the Security
Council exercised supervisory authority over UNMIK’s mandate even
though KFOR had been tasked with ensuring security.238 As to the second
part of the responsibility, the failure of one division may well result in the
problematic nature of the successor regime, but the delineation of
responsibility in this category may be less straightforward.
International courts and tribunals have embraced two main stand-
ards of control: effective control and overall control. However, the
European Court of Human Rights has, of late, begun to articulate what
may become a third standard: decisive influence. This Part examines
each and considers their pertinence to the broader responsibility identi-
fied in this Article.
1. Effective Control. — An internationally wrongful act need not have
been perpetrated by an organ of a state itself for that state’s international
responsibility for the wrongful act to be engaged. According to both the
ICJ and the ILC, international responsibility for wrongful acts not perpe-
trated by an organ of the accused state may arise if the actor carried out
the wrongful acts under the effective control of the accused state. The
ILC adopted the effective control standard in Article 8 of its Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (a provision
that the ICJ has since recognized as representative of customary interna-
tional law),239 and effective control also formed the basis of the rule of
attribution of conduct in Article 7 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations.240
The ICJ endorsed the effective control standard in the Paramilitary
Activities Case (Nicaragua v. United States).241 After rejecting the applicant’s
argument that Nicaraguan militia supported by the United States were
organs of the respondent state, the Court held that the international re-
sponsibility of the United States for actions of Nicaraguan paramilitaries
could be engaged if it were established that the United States “directed
or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and
humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State.”242 In order to uphold
such a claim, the Court concluded that “it would in principle have to be
proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary
238. See, e.g., Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 132–141
(2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-80830
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Security Council control over Kosovo).
239. ARSIWA, supra note 21, art. 8.
240. DARIO, supra note 216, art. 7.
241. 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27).
242. Id.
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operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed.”243
The Court affirmed its effective control holding in the Genocide
Convention Case (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro) and clari-
fied that effective control required “that the State’s instructions were
given, in respect of each operation in which the alleged violations oc-
curred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the per-
sons or groups of persons having committed the violations.”244 The Court
rejected the applicant’s contention that a lex specialis of attribution
applied in the context of genocide and instead required, for attribution
to the respondent state, that the wrongful acts in question “were carried
out, wholly or in part, on the instructions or directions of the State, or
under its effective control.”245
Yet, neither case involved a situation of occupation, wherein lex
specialis as to attribution appears to apply. Thus, where the Court has
considered the responsibility of an occupying state, its pronouncements
implicated a wider set of acts than the limited range carried out at the
direct instantiation of the state required in the cases just discussed.
Indeed, the ICJ made clear in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) that an occupant has a respon-
sibility by virtue of that status “to secure respect for the applicable rules
of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to
protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence,
and not to tolerate such violence by any third party.”246 The Court made
the stringency of this requirement clearer when it affirmed that Uganda
could be held responsible not only for actions of its own military forces
but also “for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in the
occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own
account.”247 Moreover, the Court held that, as the occupying power,
Uganda was under an obligation to prevent looting and that such a duty
“extends . . . to cover private persons in this district and not only mem-
bers of Ugandan military forces.”248 The Court thus concluded that
Uganda’s status as an occupant made it responsible for acts in violation
of international humanitarian law and international human rights law
that occurred in the occupied territory because Uganda had an obliga-
tion to ensure that these did not occur. Consequently, even acts not
243. Id.
244. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 400 (Feb.
26).
245. Id. ¶ 401.
246. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 178 (Dec. 19).
247. Id. ¶ 179.
248. Id. ¶ 248.
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undertaken at the direction of the Ugandan state or by persons under its
control engaged Uganda’s international responsibility because it had
failed to exercise sufficient vigilance to prevent such acts.249
2. Overall Control. — Though rejected explicitly by the ICJ in the
Genocide Convention Case,250 the overall control standard for the
determination of state responsibility has been adopted by both the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the European Court of Human Rights. In Tadić, the ICTY held, where a
wrongful act had been perpetrated by “an organised group,” that “for the
attribution to a State of acts of these groups it is sufficient to require that
the group as a whole be under the overall control of the State.”251 The
Court declared that if the state’s overall control of the accused group had
been proved, “it must perforce engage the responsibility of that State for
its activities, whether or not each of them was specifically imposed, requested or
directed by the State.”252
Similarly, in situations of occupation by a foreign state and territorial
administration by an international organization, the European Court of
Human Rights has affirmed the applicability of an overall control theory
for the attribution of conduct and the imputation of liability. In Loizidou
v. Turkey,253 the applicant, a Greek Cypriot, alleged that the refusal by the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (a breakaway entity
formed after Turkey invaded and occupied the northern part of the
island) to allow her to access her property located in northern Cyprus
constituted a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights
attributable to Turkey. The Court held that “[i]t is not necessary to
determine whether, as the applicant and the Government of Cyprus have
suggested, Turkey actually exercises detailed control over the policies
and actions of the authorities of the ‘TRNC’” because “[i]t is obvious
from the large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern
Cyprus . . . that her army exercises effective overall control over that part
of the island.”254 Consequently, “[s]uch control . . . entails her respon-
sibility for the policies and actions of the ‘TRNC.’”255 Thus, the European
Court of Human Rights’s ruling that a determination of “detailed control
over the policies and actions of the authorities” is not required stands in
direct contrast to the ICJ’s position in the Genocide Convention Case that
attribution requires a showing that the accused state gave instructions “in
249. Id. ¶ 179 (holding Uganda responsible for “lack of vigilance” in preventing
violations by other groups, “including rebel groups acting on their own account”).
250. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. ¶¶ 402–403.
251. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 120 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
252. Id. ¶ 122.
253. 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216.
254. Id. at 2235.
255. Id. at 2235–36.
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respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not
generally in respect of the overall actions.”256
Further, in Behrami, the Kosovar applicants (the family of children
killed and injured by unexploded cluster bombs that French KFOR
troops had been aware of but had failed to clear and a detainee held by
UNMIK police on orders of the Norwegian Commander of KFOR)
alleged violations of the European Convention on Human Rights by
France and Norway, respectively. With regard to the attribution of the
acts of KFOR, each respondent government asserted that “[t]he security
presence acted under U.N. auspices and action was taken by, and on
behalf of, the international structures established by the [Security
Council]” and, as such, the Security Council retained ultimate control
for purposes of attribution.257 The court agreed, rejecting the applicants’
contention that responsibility ought to attach to the contributing coun-
tries of KFOR because of their effective control of ground operations and
instead observing that “the key question is whether the UNSC retained
ultimate authority and control so that operational command only was
delegated.”258 On this basis, the court found that the impugned acts of
KFOR were attributable to the United Nations rather than to the
respondent states.259
3. Decisive Influence. — Effective and overall control are two measures
of varying stringency that may determine the attribution of impugned
acts. The ICJ’s holding in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
indicates that during times of occupation, the occupying power may be
held liable for violations perpetrated by private individuals or groups
outside of the occupant’s control.260 Yet, the European Court of Human
Rights has expanded responsibility for human rights violations even fur-
ther through its jurisprudence concerning Transdniestria.
Transdniestria is a breakaway region of Moldova able to retain its
autonomy through the financial and military support of Russia, but
which the international community has failed to recognize as a state in its
own right since it declared independence in 1991.261 While Russia exer-
256. Compare id., with Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43,
¶¶ 400, 402–403 (Feb. 26).
257. Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 91 (2007), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-80830 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
258. Id. ¶ 133.
259. Id. ¶ 141.
260. See, e.g., supra notes 246–249 and accompanying text (discussing case).
261. Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, 198–227.
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cises a significant influence over Transdniestrian affairs, Russia is not in
occupation of the territory.262
In Ilaşcu, the applicants (four Moldovan nationals) brought an
action against both Russia and Moldova for alleged breaches of the
European Convention on Human Rights that occurred in Transdniestria
and were perpetrated by officials of the breakaway entity (the Moldovan
Republic of Transdniestria).263 The Court found for the applicants, but
the Court’s conclusions as to attribution and the apportionment of
responsibility are particularly noteworthy.
As to attribution generally, the Court held that “detailed control
over the policies and actions of the authorities in the area situated out-
side its national territory” is not required to find that the responsibility of
the respondent state has been engaged but that instead “overall control
of the area” is sufficient.264 Further, overall control would be an adequate
basis of attribution not merely of acts of the state’s own forces, but also of
acts of the local authorities over which the respondent state exercised
overall control.265 With regard to Moldova, “the only legitimate govern-
ment” of Transdniestria, the Court found that although Moldova “does
not exercise authority” in the region, Moldova had a positive obligation
to take “diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures” in accordance
with international law “to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed
by the Convention.”266
With regard to Russian responsibility for the impugned acts, the
Court observed that Transdniestria was “under the effective authority, or
at the very least under the decisive influence, of the Russian Federation”
and that this basic showing of “decisive influence,” when combined with
the fact that Russia did not take any action to put an end to or prevent
the violations complained of by the applicants, was sufficient to engage
Russia’s international responsibility for wrongful actions of the
Transdniestrian authorities.267 Although the Court recently modified its
approach to the situation in Transdniestria in Catan v. Moldova (wherein
it considered Russia’s decisive influence a factor in the determination of
jurisdiction rather than responsibility),268 the Court still found that
Russia’s international responsibility had been engaged by violations of
262. See, e.g., id. at 314–15 (Ress, J., dissenting in part) (“In the present case there is
no occupation of the Transdniestrian territory, even though there is a rebel regime and
the Russian Federation exercises a decisive influence and even control in that territory.”).
263. Id. at 191–92 (majority opinion).
264. Id. at 263 (citing Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2235–36).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 266.
267. Id. at 282. In apportioning liability to pay pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages,
the Court adjudged Moldova liable for approximately one-third of the total and Russia for
the remainder. Id. at 305–06 (dispositif).
268. App. No. 43370/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 115 (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-114082 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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the applicants’ rights by a policy of the Transdniestrian authorities that
Russia had itself sought to have changed.269
Yet, the facts cited by the Court to support its inference of decisive
influence (for example, Russian monetary payments to the government
and population of Transdniestria, favorable provision of natural gas to
Transdniestria by Gazprom, a deployment of 1,500 Russian troops) are
not very different from those persisting during the immediate aftermath,
and often for some time thereafter, of regime-change operations.
Indeed, both U.S. financial aid to, and troop presences in, Iraq and
Afghanistan remain substantial, and the question of the United States’
decisive influence (though perhaps now on the wane) could very well
have been akin to that of Russia in Transdniestria.
* * *
The extent and scope of responsibility for failure to discharge the
obligations identified in this Article may well depend not only on the fac-
tual scenario in question but also on the doctrine of control that is to be
preferred. While the most restrictive of these—effective control—would
still support the first part of the responsibility for regime change pro-
posed when an intervening state actually establishes such control, the
second part of the responsibility (that concerning subsequent bad acts of
the successor regime installed) may well depend on the attribution of
such acts on the basis of decisive influence. While it is not for this Article
to reconcile the inconsistencies in the jurisprudence of international
responsibility, the foregoing discussion ought to illustrate that the extent
of responsibility may vary depending on the doctrine of attribution
applied.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The present study and the postconflict obligations of regime change
articulated herein have many further implications and may give rise to
myriad other issues. This Part highlights a few of these as matters for
future consideration and research. Some of the questions raised present
ongoing challenges not simply in this particular field, but also in general
international law.
A. Pluralism
The first part of the obligation proposed in this study requires that
regime changers not only reestablish security and assist in postconflict
reconstruction, but also promote representative local government,
ensure the protection of human rights, and safeguard minority groups.
These last three duties raise particular challenges. Indeed, representative
government is often used interchangeably here, and in the various inter-
269. Id. ¶¶ 149–150 (finding Russia “exercised effective control” over Transdniestria
even though it sought to change policies that violated applicants’ rights).
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national legal pronouncements cited, with democracy. However, as the
U.N. General Assembly recognized in Resolution 55/96 on promoting
and consolidating democracy, “[T]here is no one universal model of
democracy.”270 The resolution calls on states to promote and consolidate
democracy by promoting pluralism, protecting human rights, maintain-
ing free and fair electoral systems, enabling wide participation from civil
society, and working toward the broader attainment of economic, social,
and cultural rights.271 Yet, the fact that no state voted against the resolu-
tion (despite the fact that the governing structure of some states would
appear to embody the very antithesis of the principles adopted) is per-
haps an indication of the lack of consensus over the true content of
democracy.
Similarly, with regard to the protection of human rights, the ques-
tion of “which rights?” pertains. For example, Security Council resolu-
tions concerning Afghanistan regularly mandate the equality of women,
but the exact meaning of this notion in the domestic context may be
debated. Though UNMIK decided that the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
would apply in Kosovo,272 the United States’ persistent refusal to ratify
the Convention is well known.273 Moreover, the apparent tension
between peace with the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and the pro-
tection of women’s rights persists.274
It may be remarked briefly on the protection of minority communi-
ties that in many cases these are the groups most closely affiliated with
the regime toppled by the intervening state. In this connection, one
recalls the Sunnis in Iraq, Serbs in Kosovo, and perhaps eventually the
Alawites in Syria as examples of this phenomenon. Such groups fre-
quently have entrenched political and economic interests obtained
through connections with the old regime, and their perceived links to
270. G.A. Res. 55/96, supra note 44, at 2; see also Marc Cogen & Eric De
Brabandere, Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 20 Leiden J. Int’l
L. 669, 670 (2007) (describing evolution of how democracy is understood by United
Nations).
271. G.A. Res. 55/96, supra note 44, at 2.
272. UNMIK, Reg. No. 1999/24, supra note 154, § 1.3.
273. Cf. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (listing signatories to CEDAW).
274. See, e.g., Hamid Karzai Under Fire on Afghan Women’s Rights, Telegraph
(U.K.) (Mar. 8, 2012, 9:38 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afg
hanistan/9130508/Hamid-Karzai-under-fire-on-Afghan-womens-rights.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (reporting accusations of dismissing women’s rights to woo
Taliban); Dan Murphy, Karzai Says Taliban No Threat to Women, NATO Created ‘No
Gains’ for Afghanistan, Christian Sci. Monitor (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Security-Watch/Backchannels/2013/1007/Karzai-says-Taliban-no-threat-to-women-
NATO-created-no-gains-for-Afghanistan (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting
ongoing concern for women’s rights in Afghanistan).
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the former rulers may make respect for their interests less palatable to
the newly empowered majority.275
Those involved in international missions of the sort detailed here
may well be viewed as “human rights imperialists.”276 Yet, whether the
alternative of leaving the existing laws of the occupied state in force or of
adopting only those human rights norms universally agreed upon is pref-
erable may be contested.
B. Self-Determination
It may be objected that the obligations identified in this Article
require the long-term presence of the intervening state or administering
organization and that, because of the unrepresentative quality of such
foreign overseers, the application of such obligations will, in practice,
contravene the right of self-determination of the local population. Often
populations wish such foreign officials to leave long before the actual
withdrawal occurs.277 Yet, an unplanned and overly hasty withdrawal that
leads to chaos or intercommunal bloodshed is an inherently undesirable
result.278
One possible amendment to existing procedure might be a
requirement that a local consultation exercise of some sort (perhaps a
referendum) be held at the earliest opportunity to determine whether
the population wishes for the occupying force to stay or leave. There are
many practical and logistical constraints in this approach, but a result in
either direction might serve as sufficient justification for the actions
(whether the discharge of the obligations outlined here or exit) of the
foreign force. Constructing a question that captures nuances of prefer-
ence is difficult, but, to the extent that such an exercise is possible, it may
serve to defuse concerns over respect for the right of self-determination.
However, the objection to privileging such an exercise of early self-
determination is that many of these military interventions have either ex
275. See, e.g., Stromseth et al., supra note 12, at 97 (describing problems in
transitional process for minority groups such as Sunnis in Iraq).
276. E.g., Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 38
(2011) (Bonello, J., concurring), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-105606 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
277. See, e.g., Tansey, supra note 12, at 78–79 (describing East Timorese
dissatisfaction with level of Timorese representation within UNTAET by early 2000 as
“crisis of legitimacy” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Jon
Cohen, Afghan Poll Shows Falling Confidence in U.S. Efforts to Secure Country, Wash.
Post (Dec. 6, 2010, 6:02 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/12/06/AR2010120601788.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Nationwide,
more than half of Afghans interviewed said U.S. and NATO forces should begin to leave
the country in mid-2011 or earlier.”).
278. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council
Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. S/2001/394 (Apr. 20, 2001)
(emphasizing importance of planned, orderly end to peacekeeping missions).
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ante or post hoc received the approval of the Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter. As such, the Security Council will have
made a determination that the situation presents a threat to, or breach
of, the peace, such that the international presence is necessary to accom-
plish some broader objective related to international peace and security.
Indeed, while Article 2(7) of the Charter excludes matters of domestic
jurisdiction from the purview of the United Nations, this provision does
not affect the powers of the Security Council to order enforcement
measures.279 Regarding whether the Security Council deems it appropri-
ate to curtail the right of self-determination of the state in question
through authorizing an international administration mission, and the
extent to which such a decision is intra or ultra vires, the Security
Council’s powers under the Charter would require further examination.
C. Set-Offs and Incentives
Regime changers may well claim, at least when they are removing an
autocratic government, that they are doing a service to the formerly
oppressed population and to the international community at large. As
such, so this sort of argument might proceed, states that undertake
regime change successfully ought to be compensated for the good that
their intervention has done or to claim this good as a set-off against any
claim for damage incurred through such operations.280 Though this posi-
tion may have some intuitive appeal (particularly for those seeking incen-
tives to convince reluctant states to accept the “responsibility to protect”
principle), two objections, one policy and the other legal, persist. First,
offering a reward for regime change is likely only to enhance the signifi-
cant optimism-bias of political officials, whose failure to appreciate the
long-term and often deleterious consequences of such military opera-
tions is on full display when other targets for regime change are freely
bandied about.281
Second, international law operates in a manner similar to the com-
mon law “Good Samaritan” rule.282 As such, states must pay compensa-
279. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
280. See, e.g., Zach Carter & Joshua Hersh, Bachmann: Iraq Should ‘Fear’ America,
Reimburse War Costs, Huffington Post (VIDEO) (Oct. 23, 2011, 5:12 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/23/bachmann-iraq-should-fear_n_1027116.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting U.S. Representative Michele Bachmann’s
assertion, “Iraq should reimburse the United States fully for the amount of money that we
have spent to liberate these people”); Matt Wells, Donald Trump’s Remedy for America:
Oil from Iraq to ‘Pay Ourselves Back,’ Guardian (Mar. 15, 2013, 11:05 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/15/donald-trump-cpac-speech-repub
licans-iraq (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing statement urging retrieval of
oil from Iraq to resolve U.S. economic crisis).
281. See, e.g., supra note 3 (listing recent examples of proposals for military
intervention).
282. See, e.g., Saira Mohamed, Omissions, Acts, and the Security Council’s
(In)actions in Syria, 31 B.U. Int’l L.J. 413, 425 (2013) (noting “there is no general duty to
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tion for damage caused by their activities that otherwise may well be ben-
eficial. Thus, when a Russian satellite crashed in Canadian territory,
Russia paid Canada compensation for the damage.283 It was not for Russia
to object that the satellite had served some scientific purpose for which it
ought to be compensated or, at the very least, the benefit of which ought
to be taken into account in reducing the amount of compensation owed.
Similarly, states undertaking military intervention and postconflict ad-
ministration must do so with care and, whether these activities confer
benefits on the local population or not, a failure to discharge such an
obligation may engage the international responsibility of the states or
international organizations in question.
D. Legality of the Entry
Theories of jus post bellum that describe postconflict responsibilities
have been criticized as an attempt to revive pre-Charter doctrines of just
war. Indeed, Eric De Brabandere has argued that the imposition of post-
conflict responsibilities on the basis of such theories merely distracts
from the defined bases for the use of force in the Charter.284
The position laid out in this Article is agnostic in this respect. The
orientation of the present inquiry is that, leaving aside questions of the
justness or legality of various military interventions, international lawyers
cannot help but realize that states are both using force and administering
occupation projects in ways that extend beyond the black letter of inter-
national law. It is therefore preferable to discern and articulate some
legal framework in the face of such developments than simply to wring
one’s hands at apparent gaps in the law. Indeed, in a similar vein, the
European Court of Human Rights noted in Loizidou that the responsibil-
ity of a state that is a party to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms “may also arise
when as a consequence of military action—whether lawful or unlawful—
it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory.”285
The Court affirmed that the obligation to secure the rights of the
Convention “derives from the fact of such control.”286
rescue” but “bystander takes on a legal duty when she voluntarily assumes care of a victim
and isolates the victim from other help”).
283. Protocol in Respect of the Claim for Damages Caused by the Satellite “Cosmos
954,” Can.-U.S.S.R., Apr. 2, 1981, 1470 U.N.T.S. 269; Canada: Claim Against the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics for Damages Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954, Can.-U.S.S.R., Annex
A, Jan. 23, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 899.
284. Eric De Brabandere, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept, 43 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 119, 134–37
(2010) (“Under the existing exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force, the
advocated connection of post-conflict responsibilities is problematic.”).
285. Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23–24
(1995) (declaring judgment on preliminary objections).
286. Id.
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Likewise here, the argument presented concerning the twofold obli-
gation of regime changers is not dependent on a determination that the
foreign presence is lawful or otherwise. Moreover, even where the initial
use of force has been criticized as a violation of the Charter, as with the
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003,287 the eagerness of the international
community and the Security Council, in particular, to bring postconflict
administration under the supervision of the United Nations illustrates
the adjustments that states sometimes make in the face of factual
realities.
E. Abuse, Enforcement, and the Security Council
There is a very real possibility that the recognition of the obligations
proposed here may lead to abuse, with states using these as an excuse for
prolonged occupations or the installation of puppet regimes. Moreover,
given that two of the cases for breach of international trusteeship obliga-
tions lodged at the ICJ did not proceed to the merits and the third took
many decades to resolve, it may be observed that avenues for judicial en-
forcement in this respect are limited.288
The supervisory role of the Security Council is therefore essential.
The Security Council has proven its willingness previously to take action
against, and even impose an obligation of compensation for, an unlawful
occupation (namely that of Iraq against Kuwait).289 Moreover, even when
the impugned occupation is perpetrated by one of the Security Council’s
permanent members (making punitive sanction by the Security Council
unlikely), states’ desire for legitimation by the Security Council means
that any of the permanent members or a sufficient majority of the non-
permanent members may act to deny such legitimation as a means of
supervision or enforcement.290 Further, even if the Security Council does
287. See, e.g., Carmen Gentile, Brazil, Other LatAm Leaders Denounce War, UPI
(Mar. 18, 2003, 4:20 PM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2003/
03/18/Brazil-other-LatAm-leaders-denounce-war/UPI-94031048022449/ (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (quoting President Lula of Brazil as saying U.S. demand for regime
change in Iraq “disrespects the United Nations”).
288. See, e.g., Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 240, ¶ 6 (June 26) (noting Nauru’s allegations of
maladministration of territory against Australia); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber.
v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 99 (July 18) (finding applicants had
no legal right or interest in claims before court); Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v.
U.K.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1963 I.C.J. 15, 38 (Dec. 2) (holding case should
not proceed to merits in part to preserve judicial function of court). With regard to
Nauru, the case was discontinued after Australia agreed to pay Nauru a cash settlement of
107 million Australian dollars. Agreement Between Australia and the Republic of Nauru
for the Settlement of the Case in the International Court of Justice Concerning Certain
Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Austl.-Nauru, Aug. 10, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1474.
289. S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
290. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 92, at 188–89 (noting Council’s importance as
body for collective legitimation).
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not act, states may refuse to recognize the entity established or the gov-
ernment installed by the foreign force, as has been the case concerning
the nonrecognition of Transdniestria or the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus.291
It is therefore unfortunate that, in a recent article, Gregory Fox
obscures the sanctioning power of the Security Council and the collective
nonrecognition of other states as checks to ensure the effective imple-
mentation of transformative occupation.292 Transformative occupation
missions are expensive and time consuming. Consequently, the articula-
tion of postconflict obligations beyond the minimalism to which Fox
clings293 may well make states more reluctant (rather than less, as Fox
claims) to initiate transformative military projects. The barrier of cost
and the erosion over time of political will ought to point in favor of the
imposition of transformative obligations on states for anyone who, like
Fox, is concerned at the erosion of Article 2(4) as an effective prohibi-
tion on states’ unilateral use of force absent Security Council authoriza-
tion. The present Article merely acknowledges the reality that states have
used force to initiate regime-change operations without Security Council
authorization and asserts that to ignore the significant reforms that oc-
cupiers have introduced at the urging of the international community
would allow the perfect to become the enemy of the good.
CONCLUSION
Regime change does not come without responsibility. This responsi-
bility is not merely political or moral, but legal. It is consequently binding
on the state or international organization that has undertaken such a
mission.
The responsibility entails a twofold obligation concerning admin-
istration of the territory while exercising control and ensuring that the
successor regime thereafter will respect the rights of the population.
These obligations extend beyond the formal text of the Hague and
Geneva agreements relative to occupation. Yet, the increasing promotion
of human rights and representative government has, supported by cer-
tain general principles of international law, led states to undertake sub-
sequent practice in the application of these treaties through which states
291. On the collective nonrecognition of the TRNC, see S.C. Res. 541, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/541 (Nov. 18, 1983), which calls on member states not to recognize TRNC. On the
collective nonrecognition of Transdniestria, see Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R.
179, 192, which notes that Transdniestria “is not recognised by the international
community.”
292. Gregory H. Fox, Transformative Occupation and the Unilateralist Impulse, 94
Int’l Rev. Red Cross 237 (2012).
293. Id. at 241 (“Enshrining transformative occupation into doctrine threatens to
reverse [collective governance’s] hard-won legitimacy, for its only consequence would be
to empower unilateral state occupiers.”).
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have manifested their agreement to this revised understanding of the
laws of occupation and international territorial administration.
In July of 2004, then-state Senator Barack Obama declared that the
United States had “an absolute obligation” to remain in Iraq until the
regime-change mission initiated was completed.294 This Article has given
some specificity to this “absolute obligation” and weighed the implica-
tions of its recognition in international law. Political officials considering
regime-change missions ought now to be made aware of the significant
and ongoing legal obligations that such actions trigger.
294. Farah Stockman, Obama Stance on Iraq Shows Evolving View, Bos. Globe (Mar.
8, 2008), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/03/08/obama_stance_on_
iraq_shows_evolving_view/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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APPENDIX 1: AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES (AFGHANISTAN)
State Speaker Quote Source
China Minister of
Foreign
Affairs
Jianxuan
“We will continue to work construc-
tively for lasting peace in Afghanistan
and its post-war rehabilitation,” and
“[w]e support the important role of the
United Nations in this regard.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 5th
plen. mtg. at
16, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.5
(Sept. 13,
2002).
Estonia President
Ilves
“It is important to settle conflicts in
other places as well, such as Afghani-
stan. We need to increase the presence
and visibility of the United Nations
there, which would be an encouraging
sign for the local population and would
also send a signal to other international
aid organizations and non-governmen-
tal organizations that they should
increase their activities. The United
Nations should also assume a greater
role in coordinating the reconstruction
effort in Afghanistan.”
U.N. GAOR,
62d Sess., 5th
plen. mtg. at
34–35, U.N.
Doc.
A/62/PV.5
(Sept. 25,
2007).
Finland Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Tuomoja
“In Afghanistan we are now faced with
the need to use a full range of civilian
crisis management capabilities, as well
as with the need for a long-term com-
mitment to reconstruction and the de-
velopment of a stable and drug-free
economy, and to enable democracy
and respect for human rights to take
root in a country that has suffered from
war and strife for decades. And
Afghanistan is only one of many places
in today’s world where such a commit-
ment from the international commu-
nity is needed.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 6th
plen. mtg. at
24, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.6
(Sept. 14,
2002).
France Minister of
Foreign
Affairs de
Villepin
“We must now rebuild; we must help
the Afghan people, maintain our ef-
forts over the long term, and continue
our work to bring about stability and
democracy, but also to dismantle the
drug economy and the trafficking it
fuels.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 3d
plen. mtg. at
28, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.3
(Sept. 12,
2002).
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State Speaker Quote Source
Germany Deputy
Chancellor
and Minister
for Foreign
Affairs
Fischer
“The implementation of the provisions
of the Bonn Conference agreement
began with the formation of a legiti-
mate Interim Administration. . . . For
the first time in years, the Afghan peo-
ple have the chance to lead a life of
dignity based on self-determination. . . .
The commitments of the donor coun-
tries must materialize in the form of
concrete projects.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 6th
plen. mtg. at
18, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.6
(Sept. 14,
2002).
Iceland Minister for
Finance and
Acting
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs and
External
Trade Haarde
“We must maintain an ongoing com-
mitment to Afghanistan, where serious
challenges to the rebuilding of the
country continue to be faced. Iceland
has demonstrated its support and has
assumed the leading role in running
the Kabul international airport, under
the auspices of the NATO-led Inter-
national Security Assistance Force.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess.,
10th plen.
mtg. at 49,
U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.10
(Sept. 24,
2004).
India Prime
Minister
Singh
“India’s assistance to Afghanistan’s
reconstruction and development will
continue.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 7th
plen. mtg. at
15, U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.7
(Sept. 23,
2004).
Iran Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Kharrazi
“The Islamic Republic of Iran is con-
tinuing its close cooperation with the
Transitional Government of Afghani-
stan, especially in the context of spend-
ing the $50 million in assistance ear-
marked for small-scale reconstruction
projects in Afghanistan during the
Iranian fiscal year 1381, which began
on 21 March 2002.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 9th
plen. mtg. at
21, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.9
(Sept. 15,
2002).
Ireland Minister of
Foreign
Affairs Cowen
“The sustained and wholehearted sup-
port of the international community
remains essential . . . if progress is to be
maintained. For its part, Ireland has
been active in the Security Council,
particularly in highlighting the human-
itarian situation.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 5th
plen. mtg. at
30, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.5
(Sept. 13,
2002).
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State Speaker Quote Source
Italy President of
the Council
of Ministers
Berlusconi
Noting Italy’s continued support for
“the process of democratization also
through assistance to the reconstruc-
tion of the country.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., 7th
plen. mtg. at
34, U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.7
(Sept. 23,
2003).
Japan Prime
Minister
Koizumi
Declaring that “Japan attaches great
importance to extending post-conflict
assistance for the consolidation of
peace and nation-building to prevent
the recurrence of conflicts,” highlight-
ing Japan’s efforts to collect funds for
rebuilding in Afghanistan through
convening the International Confer-
ence on Reconstruction Assistance to
Afghanistan in Tokyo, and affirming
Japan’s continued contribution “to
regional reconstruction by developing
an assistance project for the resettle-
ment of refugees and displaced people
in such areas as Kandahar.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 4th
plen. mtg. at
18, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.4
(Sept. 13,
2002).
Kazakhstan Secretary of
State and
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Tokaev
“Together with all interested States and
parties, our country supports the key
role of the United Nations in the post-
conflict peace-building in Afghani-
stan.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 6th
plen. mtg. at
9, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.6
(Sept. 14,
2002).
Luxembourg Deputy Prime
Minister and
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs and
External
Trade Polfer
“The effort made by the international
community in Afghanistan must, as we
know, be continued over time to insure
the establishment and functioning of a
stable democratic and fully representa-
tive State.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 7th
plen. mtg. at
6, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.7
(Sept. 14,
2002).
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Malaysia Deputy Prime
Minister
Badawi
“We are pleased that Afghanistan is
now on the threshold of becoming a
viable, progressive and democratic
State. However, many impediments to
national unity and cohesion remain.
These must be overcome through sus-
tained international support and, more
importantly, through the political will
and commitment of the people of
Afghanistan themselves. Such support
should take the form of increased in-
fusion of development funds and other
forms of assistance and, more urgently,
the promotion of a more secure envi-
ronment in the whole country. We owe
it to the long-suffering Afghan people
to assist in the rehabilitation of their
country and to ensure that the circum-
stances that led to their civil strife are
removed and that they will not be aban-
doned once the immediate task of
removing terrorist elements in Af-
ghanistan is completed.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 7th
plen. mtg. at
8, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.7
(Sept. 14,
2002).
Norway Prime
Minister
Bondevik
“As the country holding the chairman-
ship of the Afghan Support Group, we
have focused on the need for both
humanitarian assistance and long-term
reconstruction aid. A sustained inter-
national presence is essential.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 3d
plen. mtg. at
22, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.3
(Sept. 12,
2002).
Pakistan Foreign
Secretary
Khan
“The international community . . . has
an important responsibility to help
Afghanistan with a Marshall Plan-like
programme for reconstruction.”
U.N. GAOR,
62d Sess.,
14th plen.
mtg. at 33,
U.N. Doc.
A/62/PV.14
(Oct. 2,
2007).
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Qatar First Deputy
Prime
Minister and
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs Al-
Thani
“[W]e have a special programme in Af-
ghanistan that assists in the rebuilding
of that country; the programme’s cost
has amounted to $62 million thus far.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
14th plen.
mtg. at 10,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.14
(Sept. 26,
2003).
Republic of
Korea
Minister of
Foreign
Affairs and
Trade
Sunghong
Highlighting the challenges of terror-
ism, lack of good governance, and
international marginalization and
noting that “[w]e are now working with
other countries to contribute to the re-
habilitation of Afghanistan.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 5th
plen. mtg. at
17, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.5
(Sept. 13,
2002).
Romania Minister of
Foreign
Affairs
Geoana
“The intense effort that the United Na-
tions has embarked upon in the demo-
cratic and physical reconstruction of
the country is commendable. Romania
believes that this commitment must be
maintained as long as the dangers of a
serious renewal of violence exist.
Romania has already made a solid
financial contribution to the interna-
tional aid effort and is ready to offer
further assistance, according to the
requirements of the Afghan Govern-
ment.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 6th
plen. mtg. at
14, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.6
(Sept. 14,
2002).
Slovenia President
Drnovšek
“We should not allow the focus on the
most visible crises and on the fight
against terrorism to lead to the neglect
of other dangers to global peace and
security. A single example of that
would be the areas of Africa that
require assistance in both ending con-
flicts and tackling the root causes of
such unrest. Even Afghanistan, where
so recently all eyes were focused, has
faded from our minds. Yet there is
clear danger that the chronic instability
of that country could revert to devastat-
ing civil war.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
13th plen.
mtg. at 2,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.13
(Sept. 26,
2003).
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Tajikistan Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Nazarov
“In this connection, Tajikistan believes
that it is absolutely essential that Af-
ghanistan share in the multifaceted
process of regional cooperation. We
expect our region’s leading interna-
tional partners to provide appropriate
support for that process. Indeed, that
issue could be considered by the new
United Nations Peacebuilding Com-
mission.”
U.N. GAOR,
60th Sess.,
15th plen.
mtg. at 24,
U.N. Doc.
A/60/PV.15
(Sept. 20,
2005).
Thailand Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Sathirathai
“For its part, Thailand remains firmly
committed to supporting United Na-
tions reconstruction and peace-build-
ing efforts, as we have done in the past
in Timor-Leste and Afghanistan.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
17th plen.
mtg. at 23,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.17
(Sept. 30,
2003).
The
Netherlands
on behalf of
the
European
Union
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs Bot
“In a similar vein, the process of secur-
ing stability, reconstruction and de-
mocratization in Afghanistan must
remain an international priority.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 3d
plen. mtg. at
30, U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.3
(Sept. 21,
2004).
Turkey Deputy Prime
Minister and
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs Gürel
Noting Turkey’s command of the In-
ternational Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan and urging “we must
rapidly embark upon real and tangible
development efforts in Afghanistan. . . .
Likewise, efforts to build the Afghan
national army and the police force as
well as solidarity and unity among the
ethnic groups are of crucial im-
portance.”
U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., 5th
plen. mtg. at
26, U.N. Doc.
A/57/PV.5
(Sept. 13,
2002).
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Uzbekistan Minister for
Foreign
Affairs Safoev
“We believe that the resources of the
international community, major
international organizations and donor
nations, as well as the capabilities of
neighbouring countries, should be
more intensely engaged, as they are
essential to post-conflict reconstruc-
tion. Afghanistan should become a
harmoniously integrated part of
Central Asia, and this will positively
contribute to the enhancement of sta-
bility and security in the country and
region. In view of the exceptional im-
portance of the socio-economic reha-
bilitation of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is
rendering assistance to the Afghan peo-
ple in the reconstruction of damaged
roads and the construction of new
ones, as well as supplying electricity to
the northern provinces of Afghanistan.
Uzbek specialists have built eight large
bridges along the road from Mazari
Sharif to Kabul. Uzbekistan is also de-
livering humanitarian assistance to
Afghanistan. More than 1 million
tonnes of humanitarian cargo have
been shipped through our country’s
territory. We will continue to cooperate
with international organizations,
foremost with the United Nations, in
this regard.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
18th plen.
mtg. at 12,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.18
(Sept. 30,
2003).
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Australia Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Downer
“Of the $100 million Australia has
committed to humanitarian and recon-
struction assistance in Iraq, much has
been directed through United Nations
agencies.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., 9th
plen. mtg. at
32, U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.9
(Sept. 24,
2003).
Austria Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Ferrero-
Waldner
“In line with the human security ap-
proach, Austria was among the first to
offer humanitarian aid. In Austrian
hospitals we provided urgent medical
assistance for children in critical condi-
tion. Furthermore, Austria participates
in the ‘Adopt a Hospital’ programme
and is about to equip two hospitals in
Nazariyah. Together with Slovenia and
Jordan, we are preparing the establish-
ment, south of Baghdad, of a centre for
war-traumatized children. These are
efforts aimed at providing relief for the
weakest and most vulnerable members
of Iraqi society.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
12th plen.
mtg. at 36,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.12
(Sept. 25,
2003).
Bahrain Deputy Prime
Minister and
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs Al-
Khalifa
“The upcoming stage requires that a
vital and effective role be played by the
international community, represented
by the United Nations, which will bear
the heavy burden of supporting the in-
terim Iraqi Government and helping it
fulfill the tasks required of it under
Security Council resolution 1546
(2004). Bahrain has on more than one
occasion expressed its support for ef-
forts to maintain peace and security in
Iraq, and to create the conditions for
the reconstruction of the country and
the maintenance of its unity. It also
reaffirmed its willingness to participate
in Arab and international efforts to
rebuild Iraq and to maintain its unity,
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 9th
plen. mtg. at
26, U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.9
(Sept. 24,
2004).
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Bangladesh Minister for
Foreign
Affairs Khan
“We stand ready to take part in the re-
construction and rebuilding of Iraq in
the true spirit of brotherhood that
characterizes the relationship between
our two nations and peoples.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
16th plen.
mtg. at 12,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.16
(Sept. 29,
2003).
Belgium Deputy Prime
Minister and
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs Michel
“But it is now necessary to contribute to
the re-establishment of stability and en-
sure Iraq’s reconstruction. That is the
responsibility of us all, for it concerns a
region neighbouring Europe, and we
cannot tolerate, if only for the sake of
our own security, increased instability
or the persistence of an uncontrolled
spiral of violence that feeds resentment
towards the international community,
which, as history has taught us, consti-
tutes the principal breeding ground for
terrorism.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., 8th
plen. mtg. at
33, U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.8
(Sept. 23,
2003).
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
President
Tihić
“With a view to helping the people of
Iraq and contributing to the establish-
ment of peace there, Bosnia and Herze-
govina has sent a unit to Iraq to destroy
mines and unexploded devices.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 5th
plen. mtg. at
3, U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.5
(Sept. 22,
2004).
Brazil President da
Silva
“We must not shy away from our col-
lective responsibilities.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., 7th
plen. mtg. at
5, U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.7
(Sept. 23,
2003).
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Cambodia Deputy Prime
Minister and
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs and
International
Cooperation
Hor
“Concerning the situation in Iraq, I
believe that the current, unending vio-
lence there has not created an envi-
ronment conducive to national recon-
ciliation and peace. It is my view that
the United Nations and the inter-
national community must do every-
thing possible to restore peace, security
and political stability to Iraq so that the
Iraqi people will have a chance to
choose, in a sovereign manner, their
own leaders and their own Govern-
ment. I believe that democracy can
never be exported or imported; it is a
state of mind and must be learned.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess.,
12th plen.
mtg. at 4,
U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.12
(Sept. 27,
2004).
Canada Prime
Minister
Chrétien
“In Iraq, we have also joined the in-
ternational effort to help the Iraqi peo-
ple. We have decided to contribute 300
million Canadian dollars, one of the
largest single-country pledges we have
ever made.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., 8th
plen. mtg. at
22, U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.8
(Sept. 23,
2003).
Croatia President
Mesić
“Croatia is still dealing with the conse-
quences of the war imposed on it and
does not have the economic resources
to participate as a donor in the action
for the reconstruction of Iraq. How-
ever, Croatia stands ready to offer its
wealth of experience in post-war re-
construction, especially in construction
work, as well as the knowledge and
operative capacities required for deal-
ing with post-war confidence-building,
strengthening the country’s stability,
normalizing life, and mending the
tears left by the war in the fabric of civil
society. I am thinking in particular of
the knowledge and experience ac-
quired in civil police training and
activities.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., 7th
plen. mtg. at
27, U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.7
(Sept. 23,
2003).
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Dominica Prime
Minister
Charles
“The return of peace and stability to
Iraq has now become the responsibility
of all States members of the interna-
tional community. If the international
community must accept and shoulder
this important responsibility, then we
must commit to a greater role for the
United Nations.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
12th plen.
mtg. at 13,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.12
(Sept. 25,
2003).
Egypt Minister for
Foreign
Affairs El
Sayed
“Egypt affirms its readiness to con-
tribute to the reconstruction process,
in accordance with the wishes and
needs of the Iraqi people and in co-
operation with the rest of the interna-
tional community, under the aegis of
the United Nations.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
15th plen.
mtg. at 18,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.15
(Sept. 29,
2003).
El Salvador President
González
“[T]he Government of El Salvador has
decided to respond to the United Na-
tions appeal by participating in the
work of reconstruction and humanitar-
ian assistance in Iraq. By its very nature,
our presence in Iraq deserves an addi-
tional explanation. We are not there
for military reasons. Ours is a consid-
ered response to the appeal launched
by this Organization for the interna-
tional community to help in the tran-
sition phase leading to the full estab-
lishment of authority based on the free
will of the Iraqi people, with absolute
respect for its territorial integrity, its
own culture and its unquestionable
right to define its own destiny. . . . El
Salvador reiterates its firm and resolute
support for peace-building and peace-
keeping operations, above all because
we have enjoyed the benefits of such an
operation, but also, of course, because
of their positive results in various re-
gions of the world.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 6th
plen. mtg. at
13–14, U.N.
Doc.
A/59/PV.6
(Sept. 22,
2004).
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France Minister for
Foreign Af-
fairs Barnier
“Neither today nor tomorrow will
[France] commit itself militarily in
Iraq. However, it reaffirms its willing-
ness, with its European partners, to
assist the Iraqi people in rebuilding
their country and in restoring their
institutions.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 7th
plen. mtg. at
29, U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.7
(Sept. 23,
2004).
Gambia President
Jammeh
“Even if we believe that the war was
wrong, it is the responsibility of the
entire human race to help put an end
to the suffering of the Iraqi people.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 8th
plen. mtg. at
5, U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.8
(Sept. 23,
2004).
Honduras President
Maduro Joest
“Despite our modest resources, we have
responded to Security Council resolu-
tions by sending a clearly humanitarian
mission, comprised of a contingent
from the Honduran armed forces, to
Iraq in order to contribute to the re-
construction, stability and democratiza-
tion of a friendly people.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
13th plen.
mtg. at 4,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.13
(Sept. 26,
2003).
Iceland Minister for
Foreign
Affairs and
External
Trade
Ásgrímsson
“Iceland, along with many other Mem-
ber States, is contributing to Iraq’s
reconstruction and will continue to do
so. The situation will demand all our
resourcefulness and a concerted effort
at cooperation by all parties in the
Security Council to ensure that the
people of Iraq are assured the destiny
they deserve. This destiny should en-
compass peace and democracy, afford-
ing equal rights and justice to all Iraqi
citizens.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
14th plen.
mtg. at 27,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.14
(Sept. 26,
2003).
India Prime
Minister
Singh
“Consistent with our longstanding ties
of friendship with the Iraqi people,
India will contribute to Iraq’s humani-
tarian and economic reconstruction.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 7th
plen. mtg. at
15, U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.7
(Sept. 23,
2004).
2014] RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIME CHANGE 575
State Speaker Quote Source
Italy President of
the Council
of Ministers
Berlusconi
“The upcoming donors conference in
Madrid provides a welcome oppor-
tunity for all those who share our con-
cern for Iraq’s future to make a positive
contribution to the political and eco-
nomic regeneration of Iraq.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., 7th
plen. mtg. at
34, U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.7
(Sept. 23,
2003).
Japan Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Koumura
“To build peace, it is essential for the
international community to ensure a
seamless and comprehensive effort to
fulfill tasks ranging from resolving con-
flicts to assisting reconstruction.”
U.N. GAOR,
62d Sess.,
11th plen.
mtg. at 55,
U.N. Doc.
A/62/PV.11
(Sept. 28,
2007).
Jordan Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Muasher
“The eyes of all Iraqis are now set on
the international community in the
hope of receiving every possible assis-
tance that would enable them to lay a
solid foundation for building a promis-
ing future that would include recon-
structing their country and regaining
its status as an active member in the
Organization and of the international
community.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
16th plen.
mtg. at 27,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.16
(Sept. 29,
2003).
Kuwait Deputy Prime
Minister and
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs Al-
Sabah
“We look forward to the international
community playing its vital role in help-
ing Iraq to fulfill its political and eco-
nomic obligations within the context of
the International Compact with Iraq.”
U.N. GAOR,
62d Sess., 8th
plen. mtg. at
31, U.N. Doc.
A/62/PV.8
(Sept. 27,
2007).
Latvia President
Vike-
Freiberga
“In the case of Afghanistan and Iraq . . .
the military measures undertaken by
the United States and its allies will have
to be followed by comprehensive
international efforts to help those
countries rebuild their societies and
their economies. I am certain that most
of us would agree on the need for re-
construction and security regardless of
our opinion about the foreign military
presence in these two countries.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., 8th
plen. mtg. at
2, U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.8
(Sept. 23,
2003).
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Macedonia President
Crvenkovski
“Building peace and democracy in
[Iraq and Afghanistan] remains a key
challenge both for the international
community and for the Iraqis and Af-
ghans themselves.”
U.N. GAOR,
62d Sess., 4th
plen. mtg. at
29, U.N. Doc.
A/62/PV.4
(Sept. 25,
2007).
Malaysia Prime
Minister
Badawi
“The international community has a
clear responsibility to assist the people
of Iraq to achieve peace and stability, so
that the unity of Iraq as a nation is
preserved, and the territorial integrity
of Iraq as a State is not compromised.”
U.N. GAOR,
62d Sess.,
10th plen.
mtg. at 13,
U.N. Doc.
A/62/PV.10
(Sept. 28,
2007).
Mauritius Prime
Minister
Ramgoolam
“With regard to Iraq, where innocent
civilians are falling victim to violence
on a daily basis, it is imperative that
necessary support be provided to en-
sure the creation of an environment in
which the Iraqi people can live in
peace and security.”
U.N. GAOR,
60th Sess.,
13th plen.
mtg. at 10,
U.N. Doc.
A/60/PV.13
(Sept. 19,
2005).
Morocco Minister for
Foreign
Affairs and
Cooperation
Benaissa
“Moreover, the international com-
munity must help the Iraqi people to
overcome the ongoing crisis by creat-
ing the conditions necessary for peace
and stability.”
U.N. GAOR,
60th Sess.,
16th plen.
mtg. at 5,
U.N. Doc.
A/60/PV.16
(Sept. 20,
2005).
Nicaragua President
Bolaños
Geyer
“We are now taking part in the purely
humanitarian mission involving mine
clearance and the provision of medical
support for the civilian population of
Iraq.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., 9th
plen. mtg. at
6, U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.9
(Sept. 24,
2003).
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Philippines Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Romulo
“The world should continue to support
the people of Iraq in their valiant effort
to create a democratic, free, pluralistic
and secure nation. The Philippines
stands ready to assist in implementing
Security Council resolution 1546
(2004) on Iraq, which was unanimously
adopted during our presidency of the
Council last June. The United Nations
has a significant role to play in Iraq in
the political process leading to the elec-
tions scheduled for January next year,
and it deserves the full support of the
international community in its efforts
to build a stable and peaceful Iraq.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess.,
11th plen.
mtg. at 17,
U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.11
(Sept. 27,
2004).
Poland Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Cimoszewicz
“I believe that the United Nations
should be a key factor in post-war Iraq’s
transition to the rule of law, democracy
and independence. The tremendous
task of the reconstruction and rehabili-
tation of Iraq should be shared by the
entire international community.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
12th plen.
mtg. at 34,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.12
(Sept. 25,
2003).
Portugal Prime
Minister
Lopes
“Iraq needs the support of the interna-
tional community. The Iraqi people,
ravaged by decades of dictatorship and
war, deserve such support. And we
should give the United Nations the
necessary means to fulfil in its entirety
the mandate provided by the Security
Council.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 6th
plen. mtg. at
34, U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.6
(Sept. 22,
2004).
Qatar Emir Al-
Thani
“[W]e will spare no effort in supporting
the reconstruction of Iraq, and we af-
firm our position of principle regard-
ing the need to safeguard its independ-
ence, sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity and non-interference in its in-
ternal affairs.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 3d
plen. mtg. at
14, U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.3
(Sept. 21,
2004).
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Republic of
Korea
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs and
Trade Ban
“We have also pledged to contribute
$260 million to that end, focusing on
areas such as health, education, capac-
ity-building, job creation and the pro-
vision of electricity.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 9th
plen. mtg. at
27, U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.9
(Sept. 24,
2004).
Romania Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Ungureanu
“Strong international support is
needed if the Iraqi people are to suc-
ceed in achieving lasting stability and
in going back to work for the country’s
prosperity. Technical and financial
support is also badly needed. It is es-
sential not to weaken the international
presence in Iraq, without which the
progress made thus far would be put at
risk.”
U.N. GAOR,
61st Sess.,
17th plen.
mtg. at 38,
U.N. Doc.
A/61/PV.17
(Sept. 22,
2006).
Russia Minister for
Foreign
Affairs Lavrov
“A resolution in Iraq will be possible
only through concerted efforts. That
requires the involvement in the politi-
cal process of all major Iraqi interests
and the implementation of the plans of
that country’s Government to reach
genuine national accord, with the con-
certed support of the international
community, including all of Iraq’s
neighbours.”
U.N. GAOR,
61st Sess.,
15th plen.
mtg. at 29,
U.N. Doc.
A/61/PV.15
(Sept. 21,
2006).
San Marino Minister for
Foreign and
Political
Affairs Stolfi
“In line with its tradition of solidarity,
and as demonstrated in recent years
through its support of humanitarian
projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo, the Middle East and in several
African countries, often in the context
of ad hoc programmes and United
Nations special missions, my country
will be pleased to contribute to the
reconstruction process in Iraq. For the
achievement of this objective, the forth-
coming conference on the reconstruc-
tion of Iraq is particularly interesting.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
14th plen.
mtg. at 29,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.14
(Sept. 26,
2003).
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Slovenia President
Drnovšek
“The complexity of the post-conflict
reconstruction and revitalization of
Iraq demands the widest possible sup-
port from the international community
and Iraqis themselves. The United
Nations is the only body capable of
serving as the embodiment of such
support. Its role in Iraq must become
more active while retaining its auton-
omy. Only a strong United Nations with
a broadly defined mandate will be able
to fulfill the role we require of it,
namely, to serve as a factor for stability
in Iraq and in the entire region.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
13th plen.
mtg. at 2,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.13
(Sept. 26,
2003).
Spain President
Aznar
“Thus, we are committed to security,
stability and the reconstruction of Iraq.
We also are committed to returning
sovereignty to the Iraqi people. We
spare no effort and do not wish to
dwell on the past. We believe that suc-
cessful results in Iraq will be due to the
efforts of the entire international
community.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., 8th
plen. mtg. at
36, U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.8
(Sept. 23,
2003).
Sri Lanka President
Kumaratunga
“As the Secretary-General’s Special
Representative for Iraq recently
pointed out, security measures alone
will not suffice to end violence and
create stability and peace. Political con-
sensus-building, reconciliation, re-
habilitation and the promotion of the
rule of law are essential for democracy
to take root. Equally important in to-
day’s interdependent, increasingly
globalized world is the commitment of
the international community to remain
engaged and to ensure that Iraq does
not become further plagued by vio-
lence and fragmented along ethnic or
religious lines.”
U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 3d
plen. mtg. at
22, U.N. Doc.
A/59/PV.3
(Sept. 21,
2004).
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Thailand Minister for
Foreign
Affairs
Sathirathai
“Thailand has already contributed
$250,000 to Iraq through the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross
and is committed to providing another
$500,000 for dried halal food. Military
construction engineers and medical
personnel are also being dispatched to
Iraq to provide further humanitarian
assistance.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
17th plen.
mtg. at 23,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.17
(Sept. 30,
2003).
Timor-Leste Minister for
Foreign
Affairs and
Cooperation
Ramos-Horta
“The international community and, in
particular, the neighbouring countries,
have a special duty to provide all neces-
sary support to the brave peoples of
Afghanistan and Iraq in their struggle
to consolidate their hard-won free-
doms . . . .”
U.N. GAOR,
60th Sess.,
16th plen.
mtg. at 27,
U.N. Doc.
A/60/PV.16
(Sept. 20,
2005).
United Arab
Emirates
Minister for
Foreign
Affairs Al-
Noaimi
“The United Arab Emirates, which is
deeply concerned about the continued
suffering of the brotherly Iraqi people
and the deterioration of their human-
itarian, security, social, economic and
environmental conditions, reaffirms
that the restoration of security and
stability in Iraq and the country’s re-
turn to the international community
will not be achieved without the collec-
tive efforts of the regional and inter-
national community to help the Iraqi
people reform their constitutional and
developmental institutions and to
enable them to manage their internal
affairs and external relations with their
neighbours and other countries so that
they can play their responsible and
historic role in the region.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
14th plen.
mtg. at 17,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.14
(Sept. 26,
2003).
United
States
President
Bush
“The people of Lebanon and Afghani-
stan and Iraq have asked for our help,
and every civilized nation has a respon-
sibility to stand with them. Every civi-
lized nation also has a responsibility to
stand up for the people suffering un-
der dictatorship.”
U.N. GAOR,
62d Sess., 4th
plen. mtg. at
8, U.N. Doc.
A/62/PV.4
(Sept. 25,
2007).
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Vietnam Minister for
Foreign
Affairs Dy
Nien
“The United Nations should continue
its worthy, active role in resolving the
Iraqi issue and in reconstructing the
country. In that regard, Viet Nam has
decided to contribute humanitarian as-
sistance to the Iraqi people.”
U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess.,
14th plen.
mtg. at 23,
U.N. Doc.
A/58/PV.14
(Sept. 26,
2003).
